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Abstract: There are several ways in which redistricting reform could in theory be achieved. 
State legislatures could voluntarily cede control over district-drawing, courts 
could invalidate especially egregious gerrymanders, or popular initiatives could 
be launched to create redistricting commissions. However, thanks to the self-
interest of legislators as well as the Supreme Court’s unfortunate recent decisions 
in Vieth v. Jubelirer and LULAC v. Perry, the redistricting initiative is now the 
only realistic way to curb political gerrymandering.  
 
This Article provides the first detailed empirical and normative examination of 
redistricting initiatives. The Article begins by making the case for the popular 
initiative in the redistricting context, and for the redistricting commission as a 
solution to the problem of gerrymandering. Relying on extensive archival 
research, it next analyzes all twelve redistricting initiatives that have taken place 
over the course of American history, positing explanations for why each measure 
succeeded or failed. Finally, the Article considers the twelve initiatives 
holistically in order to determine what factors best account for the measures’ 
passage or rejection, and how proponents of redistricting reform can improve their 
odds of success in the future. The Article’s main finding is that, contrary to the 
academic conventional wisdom, the most important reason for redistricting 
initiatives’ frequent failure is the strident opposition of the majority party in the 
state legislature. Conversely, redistricting initiatives only succeed when some 
factor—e.g. favorable national developments, the enthusiastic support of the 
state’s media establishment, dissension between the majority party’s executive 
branch officials and its legislators—defuses majority party opposition. 
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3INTRODUCTION 
Redistricting in America is rotten. Across the country, for elections of every level, district 
lines are drawn in such a way that fundamental democratic values are subverted. Sometimes 
districts take on bizarre shapes as legislators add and subtract people in order to assure a 
particular political profile. Sometimes distinct political communities—say, rural farmers or 
inner-city minorities—are split apart by district lines or merged with other very different 
communities. Sometimes districts are blatantly skewed toward one party even though the state as 
a whole is politically competitive. Sometimes, thanks to clever district-drawing, the distribution 
of seats in a state legislature or congressional delegation has little correlation to a state’s overall 
voting pattern. And, very often, all these sins are combined. When looking at a district map, it is 
not unusual to see oddly shaped districts that divide political communities, virtually guarantee 
reelection for incumbents, and enable one party to win a much higher proportion of legislative 
seats than popular votes. 
 There are several ways in which redistricting abuses could be combated, but 
unfortunately most are unlikely to transpire. Congress1 and state legislatures2 could pass laws 
 
1 The Constitution explicitly states that “Congress may at any time by law make or alter . . . regulations” relating to 
“[t]he times, places and manner of holding elections.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.  Congress has exercised this authority 
several times in the past. The Apportionment Act of 1842, 5 Stat. 491, required that House districts elect a single 
member and consist of contiguous territory. The Apportionment Act of 1862, 12 Stat. 572, reiterated these 
requirements, and the Apportionment Act of 1872, 17 Stat. 28, § 2, added the further condition that districts 
“contain[] as nearly as practicable an equal number of inhabitants.” In 1901, Congress also insisted on district 
compactness, Apportionment Act of 1901, 31 Stat. 733, and in 1911 it renewed these requirements of contiguity, 
compactness, and equipopulation, Apportionment Act of 1911, 37 Stat. 13. However, Congress did not extend the 
1911 requirements when they expired, and has failed to pass any new redistricting legislation over the past ninety 
years. Today the only federal statutory limitation on redistricting is the requirement that all House districts elect a 
single member. 2 U.S.C. § 2c (2000). 
2 Several states have either adopted standards for redistricting, or decided by statute to allow bipartisan or 
nonpartisan commissions to draw district lines. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 25-2 (1993); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 72-
1506 (1999); IOWA CODE § 42.4(5) (2003); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 1206 (2003); MONT. CODE ANN. § 5-1-
4imposing certain requirements—e.g. contiguity, compactness, preservation of political 
communities—on the district-drawing process. But legislators are the primary beneficiaries of 
the redistricting status quo, and therefore have a strong incentive not to change the rules that 
allow them to be reelected time after time. Courts could also intervene by invalidating especially 
egregious gerrymanders. But the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Vieth v. Jubelirer3 and 
League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry4 all but foreclosed federal judicial 
relief, at least on equal protection grounds. A plurality of the Court held in Vieth (and affirmed in 
LULAC) that political gerrymandering is never justiciable under the Equal Protection Clause, and 
the remaining Justices splintered over what the constitutional standard should be (and whether it 
has yet been discovered).5 As for state courts, Sam Hirsch has noted that it is “difficult to 
convince [them] not to follow lockstep the U.S. Supreme Court’s . . . jurisprudence,” and that the 
Elections Clause arguably “bars a state court from applying state constitutional law to invalidate 
a congressional map enacted by the state legislature.”6
Legislators’ self-interest and adverse court decisions leave critics of contemporary 
redistricting with only one promising avenue for reform: the popular initiative. The initiative, 
available in some form in twenty-four states,7 enables the general public to place statutory and 
 
115 (2003); WASH. REV. CODE § 44.05.090 (1994). But such states are in the minority, and their reforms typically do 
not apply to federal elections. 
3 541 U.S. 267 (2004). 
4 126 S. Ct. 2594 (2006). 
5 Justice Kennedy concurred in the Court’s judgment but wrote separately to express his view that simply because 
“no [justiciable] standard has emerged in this case should not be taken to prove that none will emerge in the future.” 
541 U.S. at 311 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment); see also LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2607 (“A plurality of the 
Court in Vieth v. Jubelirer would have held such challenges to be nonjusticiable political questions, but a majority 
declined to do so.”). The LULAC Court rejected yet another proposed standard for detecting unconstitutional 
political gerrymandering, i.e. a presumption that mid-decade redistricting is conducted solely for partisan ends and 
therefore violates the Equal Protection Clause. 
6 Sam Hirsch, The United States House of Unrepresentatives: What Went Wrong in the Latest Round of 
Congressional Redistricting, 2 ELECTION L.J. 179, 210-11 (2003). 
7 See Initiative & Referendum Institute, State I &R, http://www.iandrinstitute.org/statewide_i%26r.htm (last visited 
February 11, 2006). Forty-nine states (all but Delaware) require popular approval for constitutional amendments 
passed by the legislature. Initiative & Referendum Institute, States with Legislative Referendum for Statutes and 
5constitutional proposals directly on the ballot. After enough signatures are garnered, both 
legislatures and courts are circumvented, and the people themselves are able to decide if, for 
example, certain standards should be followed during redistricting or a commission should draw 
district lines instead of the legislature.  
 Redistricting initiatives—in the wake of Vieth and LULAC the only realistic way to curb 
political gerrymandering8—are the subject of this Article. Part I discusses the merits of the 
initiative in the redistricting context, and evaluates the bipartisan commission (the approach 
taken by almost every redistricting initiative) relative to other anti-gerrymandering mechanisms. 
The section argues that the popular initiative is particularly well-suited to combating 
gerrymandering because it allows voters to bypass the self-interested politicians who typically 
thwart efforts to make redistricting fairer. The section also contends, on the basis of political 
theory and empirical evidence, that the bipartisan commission is, on the whole, well-designed to 
prevent gerrymandering and improve redistricting.  
Part II begins to confronts the biggest problem with redistricting initiatives: the fact that 
they generally fail. The section first presents a series of factors that have been identified by 
scholars and other observers as potential explanations for initiatives’ success or failure. The 
section then examines in detail the twelve cases in which initiatives were launched to regulate 
redistricting. Each initiative’s official language, political backdrop, principal supporters and 
opponents, campaign dynamics, and eventual outcome are described. In addition, tentative 
conclusions are reached about why each initiative passed or (more typically) was defeated. 
 
Constitutional Amendments, http://www.iandrinstitute.org/New%20IRI%20Website%20Info/Drop%20Down% 
20Boxes/Requirements/Legislative%20Referendum%20States.pdf (last visited February 12, 2006). 
8 Redistricting initiatives are clearly a second-best solution since they must be conducted separately in each state, 
and are unavailable entirely in twenty-six states. It would be better to regulate gerrymandering across the entire 
country in one swoop, either through congressional or federal judicial action. But, as argued above, national action is 
virtually impossible because of federal legislators’ self-interest and unfavorable Supreme Court doctrine. 
6Finally, Part III takes a more holistic approach to the twelve redistricting initiatives. The 
section analyzes all the initiatives together in order to identify factors that were relevant to 
success or failure across a range of cases; offers recommendations that advocates of redistricting 
reform should follow in the future; and discusses the Article’s implications for the academic 
conventional wisdom on why initiatives succeed or fail. The section’s main finding is that 
redistricting initiatives always fail when they are strongly opposed by the majority party in the 
state legislature, and only succeed when some factor—e.g. favorable national developments, the 
enthusiastic support of the state’s media establishment, dissension between the majority party’s 
executive branch officials and its legislators—defuses majority party opposition. The upshot for 
reformers is that they should wait for auspicious political moments before launching redistricting 
initiatives, and try at all costs to stop the majority party from presenting a unified front of 
opposition to the measure. And the lesson for academics is that the traditional theory of initiative 
outcomes, which downplays the importance of political parties, is wrong as applied to 
redistricting initiatives. Not only do parties’ positions and campaigning influence redistricting 
initiative outcomes, they hold more explanatory power than any other factor. 
 
I. THE CASE FOR THE REDISTRICTING INITIATIVE AND COMMISSION 
Before delving into the details of the twelve redistricting initiatives, it is important to ask 
whether initiatives are a good idea in the redistricting context, and whether their typical 
approach—the creation of a redistricting commission—is an appropriate cure for the ills of 
gerrymandering. This Part argues that the answer to both of these questions is yes. Popular 
initiatives are especially well-suited to the redistricting context because it is an area where 
7legislators’ self-interest often trumps the pursuit of the public good. And redistricting 
commissions, while not a perfect solution to rampant political gerrymandering, are theoretically 
and empirically superior to the status quo. 
 
A. The Redistricting Initiative 
 
When the initiative and referendum9 were first proposed at the turn of the twentieth 
century, their supporters tended to view them as a panacea to many of the afflictions of politics. 
Woodrow Wilson believed that they would remind politicians that “they are bound in duty . . . to 
represent the sovereign people . . . and not the private interests which creep into their 
counsels.”10 Harvard professor Lewis Jerome Johnson argued that, “[s]upplemented by the 
initiative and referendum . . . the representative system will gradually but surely enter upon a 
period of honor and usefulness hitherto never surpassed and probably never equaled.”11 And 
California Governor Hiram Johnson, a prominent Progressive, claimed that after his state 
adopted the initiative and referendum, “the prosperity of the State [would be] assured, exaction 
and extortion from the people will be at an end,” and “development and progress will follow as a 
matter of course.”12 
But the century in which they have been in use has stripped some of the bloom off the 
initiative and referendum rose. According to critics, the expense of placing a proposition on the 
 
9 Initiatives are placed directly on the ballot after enough signatures are obtained. Referenda subject a legislative 
enactment to a popular vote. 
10 Woodrow Wilson, The Issues of Reform, in THE INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM AND RECALL 69, 87-88 (William 
Bennett Munro ed., 1912). 
11 Lewis Jerome Johnson, Direct Legislation as an Ally of Representative Government, in THE INITIATIVE,
REFERENDUM AND RECALL, supra note 10, at 139, 147. 
12 Hiram Johnson, Inaugural Address (Jan. 3, 1911), available at http://www.governor.ca.gov/govsite/govsgallery 
/h/documents/inaugural_23.html. 
8ballot and then conducting an effective campaign for it makes it difficult for ordinary people to 
participate in the initiative and referendum process, and results in domination by well-heeled 
special interests.13 In addition, precisely because they evade the normal checks and balances of 
the legislative process, initiatives and referenda can more easily be used to abridge individual 
rights. As Julian Eule writes, “direct democracy bypasses internal safeguards designed to filter 
out or negate factionalism, prejudice, tyranny, and self-interest.”14 Furthermore, initiatives and 
referenda may result in an undesirable distortion of public policy. “The legislative process 
provides for debate over alternatives, compromise, and consensus or agreement,” while 
initiatives and referenda present voters with a single proposition that must be approved or 
rejected in its entirety.15 Finally, the evidence that initiatives and referenda improve deliberation 
on important issues is slim. In fact, voter turnout is usually far lower in special elections for 
initiatives and referenda than in normal elections. 
 Fortunately, this critique of direct democracy has limited force in the redistricting 
context. Redistricting initiatives do not endanger individual rights since all they seek to do is 
change the process by which electoral district lines are drawn. They do not interfere with the 
complicated negotiating and favor-trading of the legislative process since they involve no serious 
spending and need not be balanced against other agenda items. Because of their diffuse impact 
and fiscally neutral posture, there is no special interest group that consistently benefits from the 
passage of redistricting initiatives. And, while not as simple and provocative as some cultural 
 
13 See, e.g., Elizabeth Garrett, Money, Agenda Setting, and Direct Democracy, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1845, 1853 (1999) 
(“As money becomes the only certain route to ballot access, the character of direct democracy is increasingly 
determined by those with financial resources.”); Jamin B. Raskin, Direct Democracy, Corporate Power and Judicial 
Review of Popularly-Enacted Campaign Finance Reform, 1 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 21, 22 (1997) 
(“[W]hether our laws emerge from legislative process or plebiscite, far too many of them are being shaped and 
determined by the expenditure and contribution of huge sums of money by interested corporate factions.”). 
14 Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1549 (1990). 
15 DAVID B. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT PROPOSITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 29 (1984). 
9issues, the question of who should draw district lines—the legislature or a commission—is easily 
understandable by voters. 
 Most importantly, redistricting initiatives are attractive because, to use John Hart Ely’s 
phrase, they promise to “unblock[] stoppages in the democratic process.”16 Redistricting is a 
context in which legislators’ incentives and the public interest are almost diametrically opposed. 
Legislators want to win reelection handily and to have their party obtain as many seats as 
possible. Under almost any theory of democracy, on the other hand, the public is more interested 
in elections whose outcome is not a foregone conclusion, districts that respect preexisting 
political communities, and legislatures whose partisan composition roughly reflects actual vote 
totals. Redistricting initiatives enable the public to rescue their interests from legislative 
hijacking. Substantive standards (e.g. contiguity, compactness, competitiveness, preservation of 
political communities) can be imposed on redistricting, or a more neutral district-drawing 
process instituted, without legislators—whose rejection of such proposals is a virtual certainty—
having anything to say about the matter. As a recent Harvard Law Review Note observes, direct 
democracy, when it addresses flaws in the electoral and legislative process, 
 
is playing precisely the role that it should: it checks dysfunctional government. . . . [D]irect 
democracy is most effective when partisan politics or special-interest influence has so distorted the 
proper operation of political markets that democratic government ceases to be responsive to 
voters’ concerns. Just as scholars have advocated an enhanced judicial role when “the ins are 
choking off the channels of political change to ensure that they will stay in and the outs will stay 
out,” so too can direct democracy promote more responsive and representative government in such 
situations.17 
Redistricting initiatives are by no means without their blemishes. As Part II discusses in 
detail, voters are not always very informed or excited about them, their accompanying media 
 
16 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 117 (1980). 
17 Note, Judicial Approaches to Direct Democracy, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2748, 2764-65 (2005) (internal citations 
omitted). 
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campaigns are often extremely misleading, and sinister motives are sometimes alleged to lurk 
behind the proposals’ technical details. Moreover, the intrinsic state-by-state nature of direct 
democracy means that redistricting reform by initiative must unfold slowly and incrementally, 
rather than in a single national legislative or judicial thunderclap. Still, on balance, the case for 
redistricting initiatives is strong. Unlike many other initiatives, they do not supplicate to special 
interests, upset delicate budgetary balances, or harm minority groups. And, as long as legislative 
and judicial paths to reform remain blocked, they represent the only realistic way for the evils of 
gerrymandering to be redressed. 
 
B. The Redistricting Commission 
 
Redistricting initiatives could in principle operate in several ways. They could allow the 
legislature to continue drawing districts, but require that certain rules about districts’ shape and 
composition be followed. They could abolish single-member districts entirely and replace them 
with a proportional representation or other electoral system.18 They could create a nonpartisan or 
bipartisan commission and grant it complete freedom to devise the district map it thinks is best. 
Or they could create a commission and limit its discretion by imposing various requirements on 
the districts that it draws. 
 In practice, every one of the twelve redistricting initiatives has taken the last of these 
approaches: establishing a commission by constitutional amendment, and then providing the 
commission with various rules to follow as it goes about drawing district lines. The main 
contrasts among the initiatives have involved the bodies to be reapportioned (state legislature 
 
18 This would only be possible for state elections. Federal law requires that all Representatives be elected through 
single-member districts. 2 U.S.C. § 2c (2000). 
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and/or congressional delegation), the standards to be used by the commissions, and the size, 
composition, and selection of the commissions. Appendix A, infra, summarizes the main features 
of the twelve redistricting initiatives. 
 Because the initiatives have been so similar, it is worth examining how compelling their 
solution to political gerrymandering—a commission with prescribed standards—is. In my view, 
the commission is quite a good solution.19 First, and most critically, the members of redistricting 
commissions are not self-interested legislators. Who exactly the members are varies from 
initiative to initiative,20 but in no case are the very politicians who will soon be running for 
reelection allowed to draw the district lines themselves. This feature of commissions encourages 
values other than the legislators’ self-interest to be pursued, for example, district 
competitiveness, the preservation of political communities, and the achievement of electoral 
results that broadly mirror the public’s political preferences.21 Of course, commission members 
are not politically agnostic saints; under the terms of several of the twelve initiatives, in fact, they 
may be executive branch officials or staunch partisans appointed by state party leaders. But the 
fact that commission members’ own careers will not be directly affected by the district maps that 
they draw frees them to focus on the public good (or, at least, to consider it more seriously than 
 
19 Redistricting commissions enjoy wide support in the scholarly literature. See, e.g., DENNIS F. THOMPSON, JUST 
ELECTIONS: CREATING A FAIR ELECTORAL PROCESS IN THE UNITED STATES 173-75 (2002); Christopher C. Confer, 
To Be About the People’s Business: An Examination of the Utility of Nonpolitical/Bipartisan Legislative 
Redistricting Commissions, 13 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 115 (2004); Robinson O. Everett, Lessons from North 
Carolina’s Redistricting Litigation, 6 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 205, 221 (2001); Samuel Issacharoff, Judging Politics: 
The Elusive Quest for Judicial Review of Political Fairness, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1643, 1647, 1691-98 (1993); Gene R. 
Nichol, The Practice of Redistricting, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 1029, 1030 (2001); Jeffrey C. Kubin, Note, The Case for 
Redistricting Commissions, 75 TEX. L. REV. 837 (1997). 
20 See infra Appendix A. The three principal formulas for commission composition are 1) for certain state officials 
(e.g. the governor, the secretary of state) to be on the commission ex officio; 2) for designated state officials (e.g. the 
governor, legislature majority and minority leaders, state party leaders) to appoint the commission members; and 3) 
for retired judges to staff the commission.  
21 See Nichol, supra note 19, at 1030 (“I am inclined to believe that independent redistricting commissions are less 
political than their legislative counterparts.”); Kubin, supra note 19, at 858 (“The legislative independence of . . . 
commissioners also affords them greater flexibility to adhere to a state's constitutionally mandated redistricting 
criteria.”). 
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legislators do). The bipartisan nature of many commissions, with an equal number of each major 
party’s backers as well as, typically, a neutral chairperson elected by the political appointees,22 
also prevents commission members from blatantly flouting democratic values. Any redistricting 
proposal that promises to result in disproportionate electoral success for one party inevitably 
provokes fierce opposition from the other party’s supporters and the chairperson.23 
Second, redistricting that is conducted by a commission enjoys greater public legitimacy 
than redistricting carried out by the state legislature. As Jeffrey Kubin notes, the latter method 
“fosters disillusionment with the democratic process because it more deeply ingrains upon the 
American psyche the image of politicians as self-interested actors feathering their own nests.”24 
Oddly shaped districts, very high reelection rates, seat counts that do not correspond to vote 
counts—all these ills may be blamed on self-serving politicians when the legislature draws the 
district lines, with the result that the public’s faith in government declines and its cynicism 
swells. In contrast, when elections conducted pursuant to a commission’s district map fall short 
of perfection, people at least know that the rules of the game were drafted by someone other than 
the game’s actual contestants.25 
Third, entrusting redistricting to a commission allows the legislature to devote more 
attention to issues of greater concern to the public. It is true that redistricting (typically) takes 
place only once per decade, but it is a very time-consuming process that generates a great deal of 
animosity among legislators battling for personal and partisan advantage. A governor’s veto or a 
 
22 A variation of this formula was proposed in North Dakota (1973), Arizona (2000), and Ohio (2005). Many states 
that have adopted redistricting commissions through legislative action (as opposed to an initiative) also have 
bipartisan commissions. 
23 See Kubin, supra note 19, at 856 (“Fundamentally, tie-breaking commissions provide for a fair fight because the 
majority party cannot run roughshod over the minority party as it would be able to in an unevenly split legislature.”). 
24 Id. at 860. 
25 See Confer, supra note 19, at 126 (“Bipartisan or nonpartisan legislative redistricting commissions increase the 
legitimacy of the entire redistricting process by removing the most self-interested group, the political parties, from 
control over the process.”). 
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court’s invalidation of the legislature’s plan, both quite common in the redistricting context, can 
further protract the process and intensify legislators’ antagonism. But when a commission draws 
district lines, both the time-drain and the poisonous side effects of legislative redistricting are 
averted.26 
Empirical evidence confirms that elections in states with commissions are superior in 
several respects to elections in states without commissions.27 Andrew Gelman and Gary King 
conducted a study of all lower house elections in thirty states over a twenty-year period. They 
found that when a single party controls redistricting, it wins on average three percent more seats 
than it would have obtained if a commission handled redistricting or if control over the 
legislature was split.28 That is, a party that would have won 100 seats under a bipartisan 
commission’s plan will typically win 103 seats if it is able to draw the district lines itself. At the 
federal level, I compared 2004 election results in the four states that employ redistricting 
commissions and have more than two congressional seats—Arizona, Iowa, New Jersey, and 
Washington—to results in the forty-three states that do not use commissions to redistrict their 
congressional delegations.29 I found that candidates’ average margin of victory was smaller in 
the commission states than the non-commission states (30.0% versus 36.6%), election turnout 
 
26 See id. at 128 (“The primary advantage gained by allowing redistricting to be done by nonpolitical or bipartisan 
redistricting commissions is that the legislature can take the time previously spent on redistricting and spend it in 
pursuit of its primary responsibility - being about the people's business.”). 
27 See also Christopher S. Elmendorf, Representation Reinforcement Through Advisory Commissions: The Case of 
Election Law, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1366, 1388 (2005) (noting that redistricting commissions have been “singularly 
effective”); id. at 1390 (“Many districting commissions that purport to be nonpartisan have acquired a reputation 
(among informed local observers) for fulfilling their mission with integrity.”). 
28 Andrew Gelman & Gary King, Enhancing Democracy Through Legislative Redistricting, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
541, 553 (1994). 
29 I did not consider the three states that use commissions but have only one or two congressional seats (i.e. Hawaii, 
Idaho, and Montana) because it is impossible to draw any conclusions about elections in such a small number of 
districts. It should also be noted that Iowa’s commission is technically advisory only, but its proposals have almost 
always been followed by the Iowa legislature. 
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was higher (59.9% versus 57.7%), and the divergence between a major party’s proportion of 
votes and its proportion of congressional seats was smaller (10.5% versus 16.2%).30 
Redistricting plans drafted by commissions are also less likely to be challenged in court, 
and more likely to be upheld when they are challenged. Christopher Confer analyzed lawsuits 
involving the district maps of the seven states—Arkansas, Colorado, Michigan, Missouri, New 
Jersey, Ohio, and Pennsylvania—that use commissions for state legislature redistricting but not 
for congressional redistricting. He found that, after the 1980 census, five of the seven 
congressional plans were invalidated but none of the state plans were struck down (and only two 
were even litigated).31 After the 1990 census, similarly, two of the seven congressional plans 
were declared invalid while only one state plan was (and that state plan, for the Arkansas state 
legislature, was the product of a commission composed solely of executive branch officials).32 
As for the four states that employ commissions for both state and federal redistricting, the 1980 
and 1990 cycles together saw only one state plan and one federal plan invalidated.33 Elections 
carried out after redistricting by a commission, then, appear to result in less litigation, a tighter 
correlation between a party’s vote and seat totals, and, at least at the federal level, more voter 
participation and more competitive races. 
 Like redistricting initiatives, redistricting commissions are far from flawless. If party 
representation on a commission is unbalanced, as is the case in several states, the commission 
may be just as dominated by partisan self-interest as the state legislature. Even if the commission 
 
30 For 2004 election data, see Fairvote, Voting and Democracy Research, Dubious Democracy 2005 Data, 
http://www.fairvote.org/?page=722 (last visited February 16, 2006). Because of the small number of commission 
states, none of the differences between commission and non-commission states are significant at the 95% confidence 
level. The probability that the differences did not arise due to chance are 88% for the average margin of victory, 
35% for turnout, 85% for Democrat seat-to-vote divergence, and 73% for Republican seat-to-vote divergence. 
31 Confer, supra note 19, at 132. If anything, one would expect state legislature redistricting maps to be more likely 
to be invalidated because of the far greater number of seats involved. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 131.  
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has an equal number of supporters of each major party, the outcome of the redistricting process 
may be a “sweetheart gerrymander,” where parties’ seats correspond to their support among 
voters but districts are drawn in such a way that incumbents coast effortlessly to victory. 
Furthermore, the near impossibility after Vieth and LULAC of challenging redistricting plans on 
partisan gerrymandering grounds means that there is no effective judicial check on commissions’ 
actions.34 If they disregard the specified redistricting criteria, or create a district map as flawed as 
that of any legislature, there is very little that the courts can do.35 Finally, some critics argue that 
even if commissions “work”—by making elections more competitive and legislative power more 
proportional to voter support—this is not necessarily a good thing.36 More competition may 
undermine party cohesion by weakening party leaders’ hold on their seats and prompting 
candidates in close races to deviate from the party line. And more proportional representation 
may hamper the state majority party’s ability to pass legislation, and, at the congressional level, 
hurt the national party that would otherwise have enjoyed a disproportionate majority of the 
state’s seats.37 
I do not find these arguments against redistricting commissions persuasive. The potential 
negative consequences of unbalanced and bipartisan commissions are belied by the empirical 
evidence cited above; even if such commissions in theory might produce gerrymanders of 
 
34 Challenges to redistricting plans on racial gerrymandering grounds—both under the Equal Protection Clause and 
the Voting Rights Act—remain available even after Vieth and LULAC.
35 For a rare example of a court striking down a commission plan for failure to follow all of the specified 
redistricting criteria, see In re Apportionment of the Colorado General Assembly, 828 Pd. 185, 194-96 (Colo, 1992) 
(upholding most of the Colorado commission’s 1990 legislative redistricting plan but invalidating the split of two 
counties, which violated the requirement that counties not be unnecessarily divided). 
36 See Confer, supra note 19, at 133-38. 
37 For example, if California were to start redistricting by commission, its congressional delegation, currently made 
up of 33 Democrats and 20 Republicans, would likely become more evenly split. This might be a “fairer” result, but 
it would substantially harm the national Democratic Party. For a state to begin redistricting its congressional 
delegation by commission in a context where most states do not, then, arguably amounts to unilateral disarmament. 
See Adam B. Cox, Partisan Gerrymandering and Disaggregated Redistricting, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 409, 450 n.118 
(2004) (“If [redistricting reforms] were successful in only a few states (or if there were a consistent partisan 
alignment among the states most likely to enact such reforms by initiative), the use of commissions might 
exacerbate certain harms.”). 
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various sorts, in practice they have not tended to do so. Moreover, even if accurate, the critique 
of unbalanced and bipartisan commissions proves only that commissions with a particular 
composition do not function well—not that all commissions are intrinsically flawed. In 
particular, a commission made up of nonpartisan experts, like the one used by Iowa, should 
result in neither a one-party nor a bipartisan gerrymander.  
 As for the argument that rigorous judicial review of commissions’ actions is unavailable, 
it merely suggests that there should be such judicial review. And in the absence of any way to 
regulate partisan gerrymandering in the courts, it is even more important that an independent 
party, not the self-interested legislators, draw the district lines. Samuel Issacharoff goes so far as 
to contend that courts should not even try to “police redistricting outcomes ex post,” and instead 
“should forbid ex ante the participation of self-interested insiders in the redistricting process.”38 
Finally, it is true that greater electoral competition and more proportional representation are not 
unalloyed goods; in the complex realm of elections, no goal can ever be achieved without some 
compromise. The key point, though, is that competition and some rough measure of proportional 
representation are far more fundamental to the democratic process than party cohesion and 
legislative efficiency. Democracy is in part about unified parties and effective lawmaking—but 
its essence is the translation of the popular will into public policy, and this deeper mission is 
advanced by redistricting commissions and undermined by the status quo. 
 
38 Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REV. 593, 643 (2002). 
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II. THE TWELVE REDISTRICTING INITIATIVES 
Redistricting commissions promise to improve American democracy, and the popular 
initiative is an attractive way to establish commissions in states where the legislature refuses to 
act. The great puzzle, then, is why most redistricting initiatives fail and why a select few 
succeed.39 Solving this puzzle is critically important for proponents of redistricting reform, who 
need to know when and where to launch initiatives, and under what circumstances to hold their 
fire. The frequent failure and occasional success of redistricting initiatives are also perplexing to 
legal scholars and political scientists, most of whom would expect such initiatives—in the 
interests of the general public, and opposed mainly by self-interested legislators—generally to 
prevail.40 
This Part begins the effort to get to the bottom of the mystery. It first outlines a series of 
factors that might explain redistricting initiatives’ success or failure. Some of these variables 
have been identified by political scientists as significant in the initiative context, while others 
emerged as important over the course of my research. The Part next describes the salient features 
of the twelve redistricting initiatives that have taken place over the course of American history, 
and offers some tentative explanations for why each initiative succeeded or failed.  
 
39 Studies of why initiatives of a specific sort succeed or fail are rare. There are no studies of which I am aware 
attempting to explain why redistricting initiatives succeed or fail. 
40 Cf. RICH BRAUNSTEIN, INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM VOTING: GOVERNING THROUGH DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN THE 
UNITED STATES 110 (2004) (presenting data that government and political process initiatives succeed at a higher rate 
than any other type of initiative). 
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A. Variables 
 
What are the variables that might explain the electoral success or failure of redistricting 
initiatives? Several political scientists, first, have identified campaign spending as a critical 
factor. According to Elizabeth Garrett, studies “have uniformly concluded that money plays a 
large role in [initiative] campaigns, particularly when it is spent to defeat ballot questions.”41 
Deep pockets allow politicians and interest groups to obtain access to the ballot—typically a 
difficult task because of the large number of signatures required—and more effectively to 
broadcast their message to the public. As a result, 78 percent of initiative campaigns are won by 
the side that spends more money, and opponents of a measure who outspend its backers win 90 
percent of the time.42 Second, some (more optimistic) scholars argue that initiatives’ outcomes 
depend on voters’ appraisal of the proposals’ pros and cons. Rich Braunstein’s data indicates that 
“inclusive” measures succeed at a higher rate than “exclusive” measures that primarily benefit a 
particular interest group (65.5 percent versus 43.5 percent), and that measures that increase 
citizens’ decision-making power succeed 73 percent of the time.43 Similarly, Andrew Skalaban’s 
analysis of two California term limits initiatives suggests that voters have the “ability to make a 
sophisticated choice between competing initiatives by voting for the one closest to their ideal and 
against the other.”44 
41 Garrett, supra note 13, at 1847. 
42 BRAUNSTEIN, supra note 40, at 75-77; see also PHILIP L. DUBOIS & FLOYD FEENEY, LAWMAKING BY INITIATIVE:
ISSUES, OPTIONS, AND COMPARISONS 182-86 (1998) (46% of California initiatives with one-sided spending in favor 
succeeded, and 90% of California initiatives with one-sided spending in opposition failed). Contra MAGLEBY, supra 
note 13, at 147 (“By spending considerably more than the opposition, can a group pass an initiative into law? . . . . 
The best available evidence indicates that this is typically not the case.”); John R. Owens & Larry L. Wade, 
Campaign Spending on California Ballot Propositions, 1924-1984: Trends and Voting Effects, 39 W. POL. Q. 675, 
688 (1986) (“Money has simply been overemphasized as a determinant of voting on direct legislation.”) 
43 BRAUNSTEIN, supra note 40, at 55, 67. 
44 Andrew Skalaban, The Mostly Sovereign People: Sophisticated Voting and Public Opinion About Term Limits in 
California, 20 POL. BEHAVIOR 35, 47 (1998). 
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Third, the positions taken by elites—major newspapers, interest groups, prominent 
politicians, etc.—arguably affect the likelihood that an initiative will pass. Jeffrey Karp’s study 
of a 1991 Washington term limits initiative showed that voters who were favorably disposed 
toward House Speaker Tom Foley and who knew that he opposed the measure were far more 
likely to oppose the measure themselves.45 James Gregg found that the electorate follows 
newspapers’ endorsements more than 80 percent of the time,46 and David Magleby determined 
that the positions of groups such as environmentalists and unions have a great deal of influence 
on voters’ behavior (greater, in fact, than politicians’ stances).47 Finally, some scholars contend 
that the framing of an initiative is critically important. David McCuan et al. interviewed political 
consultants and found that, in the consultants’ view, the most important element of initiative 
campaigns was the “drafting of messages designed to gain support or test likely objections for a 
ballot measure.”48 Magleby, similarly, analyzed several California initiatives and concluded that 
“[t]he battle over defining the proposition is one of the most important aspects of initiative 
politics . . . [T]he side that defines the issue will win the election.”49 
In addition to these factors, two variables that are not emphasized in the secondary 
literature should be cited. First, the positions adopted by the major parties, and the intensity and 
 
45 Jeffrey A. Karp, The Influence of Elite Endorsements in Initiative Campaigns, in CITIZENS AS LEGISLATORS:
DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 149, 162 (Shaun Bowler et al. eds., 1998) [hereinafter CITIZENS AS 
LEGISLATORS]. 
46 MAGLEBY, supra note 15, at 151 (citing the Gregg study); see also EDWARD C. BANFIELD & JAMES Q. WILSON,
CITY POLITICS 324 (1963) (“[W]hen voters must . . . pass on a multitude of referenda issues, the newspaper acquires 
added influence.”). Contra John E. Mueller, Voting on the Propositions: Ballot Patterns and Historical Trends in 
California, 63 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1197, 1211 (1969) (“This analysis of ballots has found little evidence to support 
the view that newspaper recommendations strongly affect the vote on the propositions.”). 
47 MAGLEBY, supra note 15, at 158-59; see also Thomas A. Henderson & Walter A. Rosenbaum, Prospects for 
Consolidating Local Government: The Role of Elites in Electoral Outcomes, 17 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 695, 717 (1973) 
(“The differing referendum outcomes [in two Florida referendums on local government consolidation] were 
associated with contrasting elite attitudes and behaviors in the campaigns.”). 
48 David McCuan et al., California’s Political Warriors: Campaign Professionals and the Initiative Process, in 
CITIZENS AS LEGISLATORS, supra note 45, at 68. 
49 MAGLEBY, supra note 15, at 168-69; see also Mueller, supra note 46, at 1211 (“[C]ampaigning . . . does seem to 
structure opinion on those few propositions on which it is conducted . . . .”). 
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consistency with which they are promoted, may have an impact on an initiative’s odds of 
passing.50 Parties have significant resources, they can easily convey their message through the 
politicians who belong to the party, and voters tend to respond to partisan cues. When a party 
strongly supports or opposes a measure, then, its stance should be expected to have some effect 
on the initiative’s fate. Second, major state and national developments may make a redistricting 
initiative more or less likely to pass. A recent egregious gerrymander or a nationwide tide in 
favor of electoral reform, for instance, may create a favorable climate for a redistricting 
initiative. On the other hand, when voters are relatively satisfied with the political status quo, 
they may be reluctant to try to fix what does not seem to be broken. 
 
B. Cases 
 
The factors that one might expect, on the basis of the secondary literature and common 
sense, to influence a redistricting initiative’s likelihood of passing are therefore the following: 
campaign spending; the initiative’s actual content and voters’ evaluation of its benefits and costs; 
the positions taken by newspapers, politicians, interest groups, and political parties; the framing 
of the initiative over the course of the campaign; and the presence or absence of important state 
 
50 The typical view in the secondary literature is that parties do not often get involved in initiative campaigns, and 
have little influence when they do get involved. See THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF 
INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND RECALL 67 (1989) (“The absence of party labels [in initiative elections] . . . denies a 
majority of voters of a familiar cue.”); MAGLEBY, supra note 15, at 174 (“There are good reasons for political 
parties to avoid stands on ballot measures.”); Elisabeth Gerber & Arthur Lupia, Campaign Competition and Policy 
Responsiveness in Direct Political Behavior, 17 POL. BEHAVIOR 287, 290 (1995) (“[P]artisan cues are usually absent 
in direct legislation elections.”); Richard L. Hasen, Parties Take the Initiative (and Vice Versa), 100 COLUM. L. 
REV. 731, 731 (2000) (“The conventional wisdom is that the initiative process weakens the intermediary role of 
political parties.”). 
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or national developments. This Section takes these factors into account while describing the 
twelve51 redistricting initiatives and evaluating why they each succeeded or failed. 
 
1. Arkansas, 1936 (Succeeded) 
 
The first ever redistricting initiative took place in Arkansas in 1936. The state legislature 
had long been badly misapportioned, with Assembly and Senate districts varying widely in 
population,52 and no reapportionment having taken place since 1890.53 In response, Amendment 
No. 23 was placed on the 1936 general election ballot. The initiative sought to create a three-
member Board of Apportionment to conduct redistricting, composed of the governor, the 
secretary of state, and the attorney general. The Board would have no power to change Assembly 
district lines, which were required to correspond to county boundaries, but would be able to vary 
the number of representatives that each county received in accordance with its population.54 The 
Board would actually have the authority to draw the thirty-five Senate districts, with the caveats 
 
51 This Article does not consider the large number of initiatives that solely addressed misapportionment, for instance 
by requiring all electoral districts to have approximately the same population. The Article only considers initiatives 
that sought to create redistricting commissions and thereby combat political gerrymandering. This choice as to scope 
was made because 1) the campaign over an initiative is quite different when the measure seeks to create equally 
sized districts as opposed to when it tries to take redistricting out of legislators’ hands; and 2) more importantly, 
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), and its progeny have wholly mooted the debate over whether equally sized 
districts and one-person, one-vote are desirable. Pre-Baker initiatives are therefore examined only if they tried to 
fight political gerrymandering in addition to legislative misapportionment. 
52 See A Fair Deal for Every County, ARKANSAS GAZETTE, Oct. 22, 1936, at 1 [hereinafter A Fair Deal] (“While a 
certain county with 44,740 population has one representative, two counties with a combined population of 43,262 
have two representatives each, giving them together four times as many votes in the House of Representatives.”); 
Inequality and Injustice, ARKANSAS GAZETTE, Oct. 23, 1936, at 1 (“The most glaring inequality of all is that 
imposed on one three-county district with 126,918 population and one senator, as compared with another three-
county district whose population is 33,225.”). 
53 See In Tuesday’s Election, ARKANSAS GAZETTE, Nov. 1, 1936, at 1.  
54 All of Arkansas’s seventy-five counties are entitled to at least one Assembly representative. Since the Assembly 
has one hundred seats, the Board has only twenty-five seats to distribute on the basis of county population. 
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that counties could not be divided for any reason, non-contiguous counties could not be 
combined, and all districts were required to have “as nearly as practicable” the same population. 
 The campaign over Amendment No. 23 was quite subdued, as the 1936 presidential race 
and other ballot initiatives absorbed most of the attention of Arkansas’s politicians and media. 
Democrat Governor Junius Futrell made no public statements about the reapportionment 
initiative, nor did the state’s legislators hold rallies or raise money for or against the measure. 
Newspaper coverage was also scant but largely supportive, with both the Arkansas Gazette55 and 
the Arkansas Democrat56 strongly endorsing the measure. In one typical editorial, the Gazette 
declared that “[a]pportionment is not a matter of one county or senatorial district or section 
against another, but a matter of fairness and justice for every resident of Arkansas wherever he 
lives.”57 
On November 3, 1936, Amendment No. 23 passed by a vote of 66 percent for versus 34 
percent against. The main reason for the measure’s success appears to have been a desire by the 
electorate—sharpened by favorable newspaper editorials—to undo the legislature’s longstanding 
misapportionment. In the absence of organized opposition, the policy arguments against 
imbalances in legislative representation prevailed. Decisions by Arkansas courts after the 
initiative’s passage confirm this assessment of why Amendment No. 23 succeeded. In the 1941 
case of Bailey v. Abington, the Arkansas Supreme Court opined that “by the adoption of 
Amendment No. 23, the people intended to correct certain evils that then existed,” namely the 
situation where “some counties with a small population [had] more representatives than others 
 
55 See A Fair Deal, supra note 52 (“Every county should of course have as many members as its population entitles 
it to have . . . . Vote “For” Amendment No. [23].”) 
56 See Amendment No. 25—Apportionment, ARKANSAS DEMOCRAT, Oct. 30, 1936, at 10 (“In the spirit of everyday 
fairness to each other the voters should support Amendment No. [23].”). 
57 See Fairness and Justice for All, ARKANSAS GAZETTE, Oct. 28., 1936, at 1. 
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with a larger population.”58 In Stevens v. Faubus, similarly, the Court stated that “[i]t was 
because the allocation [of legislators] had not been changed for many years and had become 
inequitable that the voters declared in Amendment 23 that the apportionment must be adjusted 
every ten years.”59 Importantly, partisan politics do not appear to have played a role in the 
initiative campaign. Arkansas’s Democratic Party retained firm control of the state legislature 
both before and after Amendment No. 23 passed, and no one could have expected the initiative 
to challenge the party’s predominance in a state that since Reconstruction has been one of the 
country’s least hospitable terrains for Republicans. 
 
2. Oklahoma, 1960 (Failed) 
 
Prior to 1960, the Oklahoma state legislature was one of the most misapportioned in the 
country. An observer in the Western Political Quarterly noted that “[d]espite a continuing 
urbanization, the Oklahoma legislature remains ridiculously overpopulated with rural 
representatives,” with 27 percent of voters controlling a majority of the lower chamber’s seats 
and 25 percent controlling a majority of the state senate.60 The state senator from Marshall and 
Love Counties represented only 15,879 persons while the senator from Tulsa County represented 
248,000.61 Moreover, this misapportionment existed in direct violation of the Oklahoma state 
constitution, which required districts of roughly equal population and reapportionment after each 
 
58 Bailey v. Abington, 148 S.W.2d 176, 180 (Ark. 1941). 
59 Stevens v. Faubus, 354 S.W.2d 707, 710 (Ark. 1962); see also Butler v. Democrat State Committee, 160 S.W.2d 
494, 496 (Ark. 1942) (“The purpose of the amendment was, of course, to secure equal and fair representation in the 
General Assembly upon the basis of proportionate population.”). 
60 Walter F. Scheffer, Problems in Municipal Finance, 15 W. POL. Q. 522, 525 (1962); see also George B. Merry, 
Gerrymandering Lingers Across U.S., CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jun. 13, 1959, at 10 (noting that, in the 1958 
congressional election, the Oklahoma Republican Party won just one of six seats despite receiving 31 percent of the 
vote). 
61 Jim Young, Reapportionment Poses One of State’s Stormiest Problems, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Apr. 3, 1960, at 83. 
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census.62 The Oklahoma house of representatives had last been reapportioned in 1920, and the 
Oklahoma senate had never been reapportioned in the state’s entire history.63 
In 1960, both the state’s young Democratic governor, J. Howard Edmondson, and the 
League of Women Voters, a national good government group, supported an initiative that would 
have entrusted reapportionment to a three-member Legislative Apportionment Commission. The 
commission, composed of the attorney general, the secretary of state, and the treasurer, would 
have drawn state electoral districts of about the same population every ten years (with the caveat 
that every county, no matter how small, would have been entitled to at least one representative in 
the lower chamber).64 Governor Edmondson backed the measure out of frustration with the 
rurally dominated legislature, which had refused to enact several policies that he favored. He 
campaigned hard for redistricting reform, organizing a fifty-two member committee to rally 
public opinion around the state,65 and delivering frequent speeches about the merits of the 
proposal and the danger that federal courts would intervene if Oklahomans did not address their 
legislature’s misapportionment.66 He was joined in support of the measure by major newspapers, 
 
62 See OKLA. CONST. art. 5, § 10 (repealed) (distributing House seats to counties based in part on their population 
and requiring reapportionment every ten years); id. art. 5, § 9 (repealed) (same for Senate); see also James E. 
Clayton, State Apportionment Pressure Mounts, WASH. POST, TIMES HERALD, Apr. 27, 1962, at A1 (“Under 
Oklahoma’s constitution, its two largest counties are entitled to 15 of the 44 State Senators. They have three.”). 
63 See Jim Young, Edmondson Reapportion Plan Lifts Ceiling, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Sept. 11, 1960, at 68. 
64 See id. The League of Women Voters, while supportive of the initiative, would have preferred a plan that strictly 
observed the principle of one-person, one-vote. See Apportion Petition Decision Looming, DAILY OKLAHOMAN,
Mar. 21, 1959, at 3 (“[S]ome of the league members thought [the governor’s] proposal was watered-down . . . .”); 
Women Voters Keep Their Plan on Shelf, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Apr. 3, 1960, at 27 (“League leaders objected to the 
governor’s plan to assure every county in the state at least one house member.”). 
65 See Jim Reid, Forces Massing in Petition Fight, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Aug. 5, 1960, at 5; see also Fate of Reform 
Issue Depends on Voting Size, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Sept. 18, 1960, at 1 (“[T]he Edmondson forces are putting on a 
drive for personal contact with voters to get them to the polls.”). 
66 See Federal Act Eyed in Apportionment, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Sept. 11, 1960, at 68 (quoting Gov. Edmondson) 
(“[I]f we don’t take this action it is a grave probability that the federal government will do it for us . . . . It is a fair 
assumption that unless we act and exercise our own rights we might well forfeit them.”); Young, supra note 63 
(“Edmondson contends his petitions will simply give ‘fair representation to all of the people no matter what county 
they live in.’”). 
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city governments,67 civic groups such as the League of Women Voters, the Junior Chamber of 
Commerce, and the Tulsa Jaycees,68 and the Oklahoma Republican Party, which was one of the 
main victims of misapportionment.69 
Ironically, opposition came almost entirely from within the governor’s own party. 
Oklahoma Democrats, recognizing that redistricting reform would weaken their grip on the state 
legislature, launched a furious campaign against the initiative. They formed a new organization, 
Oklahomans for Local Government, to oppose the reapportionment measure as well as two other 
ballot proposals that threatened rural interests.70 They argued that the state should retain its 
existing constitutional reapportionment formula, rather than amend it so that there would be no 
cap on the number of seats a county could have.71 They claimed that the initiative would allow a 
small number of urban counties to dominate the state legislature and pass whatever laws they 
wished.72 Most importantly, they systematically rallied rural voters through vigorous rhetoric, 
frequent campaign events,73 and an organization extending all the way to the precinct level.74 
In the end, the reapportionment initiative was defeated handily, by a vote of 35 percent in 
favor versus 65 percent against. Only three of Oklahoma’s seventy-seven counties supported the 
 
67 See Council Backs Reapportionment, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Sept. 14, 1960, at 4 (reporting that the Oklahoma City 
Council passed a resolution in support of the reapportionment initiative, but only by a 5-3 vote). 
68 See Otis Sullivant, Unity Is Sought on Legislative Apportion Plan, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Sept. 4, 1959, at 1. 
69 See Harris Urges GOP Support for Petitions, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Sept. 13, 1960, at 17. 
70 See Democrat Chiefs Fight Measures, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Sept. 8, 1960, at 11. Other groups opposing the 
initiative—e.g. the Rural Electrification Commission, the Farmers Union and Farm Bureau, the Cattlemen’s 
Association, and the County Officers Association—were also affiliated with the state Democratic Party and rural 
interests.  
71 The irony of Oklahoma Democrats defending the constitutional formula after failing to apply it for forty years in 
the lower chamber’s case and ever in the senate’s case was pointed out by Daily Oklahoman editorials. See All the 
People All the Time, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, July 3, 1960, at 10; What the Constitution Says, DAILY OKLAHOMAN,
Sept. 7, 1960, at 8 (“Actually the politicians who are hollering about the virtues of the constitutional formula have 
no desire whatever to see it or any other reapportionment proposal applied. What they really favor is the undisturbed 
status quo . . . .”). 
72 See Anything But the Facts, Ma’am, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Sept. 8, 1960, at 14 (“The voters are being told that 
‘three or four heavily populated counties’ will have enough legislative strength to pass any laws they please if 
reapportionment passes September 20.”). 
73 See Ray Parr, Governor Assailed at Petitions Rally, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Sept. 13, 1960, at 1 (describing a rally at 
Tishomingo where former governor Raymond Gary denounced the reapportionment initiative). 
74 See Reid, supra note 65. 
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measure, while “[t]he one-sided majorities” in many rural counties “were the most lop-sided ever 
given in the state on major issues.”75 The most important factor in the initiative’s defeat was the 
intensity of opposition among the state Democratic Party and its rural backers, who rightly 
feared that their political clout would be diminished if the initiative passed. Turnout was 
extremely high—and voter sentiment almost uniformly negative—in rural counties, while city 
dwellers turned out in smaller numbers and supported the initiative by less impressive 
majorities.76 As the Daily Oklahoman remarked, “[r]ural voters were fanatically determined to 
protect what they considered their interests,” while “[u]rban voters were only indifferently 
responsive to theirs.”77 Oklahoma Democrats also seem to have framed the issues in the election 
more effectively than Governor Edmondson. While the governor spoke about fairness in political 
representation, a relatively abstract concern, state Democrats told rural voters that their power 
would be undercut if the initiative passed, that the state constitution would be amended in a 
manner contrary to the intentions of the document’s framers, and that state politics would come 
to be dominated by big city interests.  
 
3. Oklahoma, 1962 (Succeeded) 
 
Two years later, Oklahoma’s reformers tried again. The initiative they proposed this time 
differed subtly from the measure that failed in 1960, in that the 1962 initiative did not seek to 
 
75 Otis Sullivant, State Votes No, No, No, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Sept. 21, 1960, at 1; see also Rural Vote 
Emphatically No, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Sept. 21, 1960, at 27 (“Never before in the history of elections [have] such 
one-sided majorities been rolled up in the rural areas. In Cimarron County, in the far end of the Panhandle,” the vote 
was “1,240 votes against to a mere 5 for reapportionment.”). 
76 See Rift in Oklahoma Hurts Democrats, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1960, at 55 (“Rural voters turned out in record 
numbers to swamp the proposals. They were favored in the larger cities, but the majorities there were not so large as 
expected and the vote was much lighter than in the rural areas.”). 
77 Where There Is Light, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Sept. 22, 1960, at 18. 
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change the constitutional reapportionment formula, only to enforce it by means of a 
commission.78 Counties would thus not be entitled to at least one representative in the lower 
chamber, nor would the cap on country representation in the lower chamber (seven) be 
eliminated, if the initiative passed.79 As in 1960, Governor Edmondson backed the measure, as 
did the state Republican Party80 and Oklahoma’s leading newspaper.81 In addition, both parties’ 
candidates for governor expressed their support for the initiative,82 and a new group called 
Citizens for Constitutional Reapportionment spearheaded the signature-gathering process.83 
More importantly, the judicial landscape had shifted between 1960 and 1962. In March 
1962, the Supreme Court held in Baker v. Carr84 that legislative apportionment presented a 
justiciable question and that electoral districts were required to have approximately the same 
population. That decision sparked widespread litigation and legislation, and galvanized 
supporters of redistricting reform across the country.85 In Oklahoma, a federal district court 
applied Baker to the apportionment of the state’s legislature, and concluded that the entire 
 
78 The proposed Constitutional Apportionment Commission would also have been composed of the attorney general, 
the secretary of state, and the treasurer. 
79 See In re Initiative Petition No. 271, State Question No. 408, 373 P.2d 1017 (Okla. 1962) (holding that the 1962 
initiative is “substantially different” from the 1960 initiative, and therefore not barred from the ballot by a 
constitutional provision prohibiting the resubmission of an initiative within three years of its initial defeat). 
80 See Apportion Drive To Get GOP Aid, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Oct. 6, 1961, at 10. 
81 See At Long Last, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Nov. 5, 1962, at 28 (endorsing the reapportionment initiative). 
82 See Governor Foes To Let Voters Decide Issue, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Sept. 29, 1962, at 3 [hereinafter Governor 
Foes] (“Both candidates early in the campaign had declared for constitutional apportionment as a general 
proposition, and each said he would call a special election on the measure if he became governor . . . .”). Governor 
Edmondson was unable to run for reelection because of term limits. 
83 See William Beecher, Political Upheaval? Cities To Gain Power if High Court’s Ruling Spurs Reapportionment,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 27, 1962, at 1; see also Apportion Backers Plan Intensive Drive, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Oct. 7, 
1962, at 11 (“Citizens for Constitutional Reapportionment announced Saturday an intensive and active campaign to 
insure success in the November 6 election.”). 
84 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
85 See Alan L. Otten, Rural Lawmakers: Rapid Reapportionment Threatens Their Hold on State Legislatures, WALL 
ST. J., Aug. 9, 1962, at 1 (“With a speed and scope defying all forecasts, the Supreme Court’s landmark 
reapportionment decision is revolutionizing the makeup of state legislatures.”); Layhmond Robinson, 22 States 
Battle on Redistricting: Fight Spurred by High Court Ruling Is Spreading Fast, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1962, at 23 
(“The politically potent issue of legislative apportionment is burning like a prairie fire across the nation. Only a 
small flame in a few states some months ago, the issue has blazed to new prominence following a landmark decision 
by the United States Supreme Court . . . .”). 
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arrangement was unconstitutional.86 The court gave the Oklahoma legislature until March 8, 
1963 to come up with an electoral regime that did not violate the Constitution, and threatened to 
reapportion the legislature itself if the deadline was not met.87 The 1962 initiative campaign, 
therefore, was conducted under the looming cloud of federal judicial intervention. 
Because of this cloud, the tone of the campaign on both sides was muted by comparison 
to the feisty 1960 confrontation. Both parties’ nominees for governor rarely discussed 
reapportionment and said they would defer to the voters’ judgment.88 Oklahomans for Local 
Government, the group that led the opposition to the 1960 initiative, did not organize against the 
1962 measure.89 And the initiative generally was “not an issue that worked up the people as the 
contesting forces did on Gov. Edmondson’s reform program, which included reapportionment, in 
1960.”90 
In the wake of this subdued campaign, the initiative passed by a margin of 55 percent for 
to 45 percent against.91 The Supreme Court’s decision in Baker and the Oklahoma district court’s 
ultimatum to the state legislature were unquestionably the most important factors explaining the 
initiative’s victory. In 1960, Oklahoma’s rural voters had believed that they could prevent 
reapportionment, and so had turned out in large numbers to preserve their political influence. By 
 
86 See Moss v. Burkhart, 207 F. Supp. 885 (D. Okla. 1962). 
87 Id.; see also Court Accepts Oklahoma Promise, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 4, 1962, at 11. 
88 See Governor Foes, supra note 82 (“The nominees for governor are willing to let the voters make their own 
decision on the initiative measure for constitutional reapportionment of the legislature.”). 
89 See Otis Sullivant, Reapportionment Issue Fails To Stir up Election Interest, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Nov. 2, 1962, 
at 5. 
90 Id.; see also Otis Sullivant, Apportion Issue To Increase Vote, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Sept. 26, 1962, at 3 (“[T]he 
initiative measure, if it gets on the ballot, will not be as hot an issue as it was two years ago . . . . The rural areas will 
not be as excited because of the federal court decision . . . .”). 
91 But this was not the end of the initiative’s story. In Allen v. Burkhart, 377 P.2d 821 (Okla. 1963), the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court ruled that the initiative had actually failed because “the aggregate number of affirmative votes fell 
short of a majority of the total number of ballots cast throughout the State in the general election.” Id. at 825. Later 
in 1963, after further legislative inaction, a federal district court reapportioned the Oklahoma state legislature. See 
Moss v. Burkhart, 220 F. Supp. 149 (D. Okla. 1963). In a nice twist, the federal district court imposed the same 
reapportionment plan that the commission created by the initiative had adopted before it was dissolved by the state 
supreme court in Allen. See id. at 156. 
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1962, it was clear that, one way or another, reapportionment was going to take place. Either the 
legislature would act on its own, or a popular initiative would pass, or a federal court would 
intercede on behalf of the principle of one-person, one-vote. The incentive to fight 
reapportionment tooth and nail no longer existed, and the 1962 initiative accordingly skulked its 
way to victory.92 
4. North Dakota, 1973 (Failed) 
 
North Dakota’s 1973 redistricting initiative, like the Oklahoma measure eleven years 
earlier, arose in the context of litigation involving the one-person, one-vote principle. In the 
1960s, courts thrice invalidated reapportionment plans drawn by the North Dakota state 
legislature.93 The North Dakota district court eventually imposed its own plan in 1965, which 
was notable for the multimember senate districts it created as well as the relatively large inter-
district population discrepancies that it authorized.94 After the 1970 census, the state legislature 
failed to reapportion itself, and the district court struck down the existing district map—
ironically, the same one that it had fashioned itself seven years earlier—and imposed yet another 
plan for the 1972 election only.95 This plan also included multimember districts and substantial 
inter-district population variance. 
 
92 Also in the 1962 initiative’s favor (though much less important than the judicial developments) was that it defused 
the criticisms of supporters of the constitutional reapportionment formula. As noted above, the 1960 initiative had 
proposed various changes to the constitutional reapportionment formula, while the 1962 initiative left it undisturbed. 
93 See Paulson v. Meier, 232 F. Supp. 183 (D.N.D. 1964) [Paulson I]; Paulson v. Meier, 246 F. Supp. 36 (D.N.D. 
1965) [Paulson II]; State ex rel. Lien v. Sathre, 113 N.W.2d 679 (N.D. 1962). 
94 See Paulson II. The plan created five multimember senate districts, and managed to have only twenty-five of 
thirty-nine districts within five percent of the average district population. NORTH DAKOTA LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL,
LEGISLATIVE REDISTRICTING – BACKGROUND MEMORANDUM 4 (2000), available at http://www.legis.nd.gov/ 
assembly/56-1999/interim-info/docs/19043.pdf.  
95 See Chapman v. Meier, 372 F. Supp. 363 (D.N.D. 1972) [Chapman I]. 
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In 1973, the Republican-dominated North Dakota state legislature finally passed a 
reapportionment plan calling for five multimember senate districts and an inter-district 
population variance of 6.8 percent.96 The governor, Democrat Arthur A. Link, vetoed the plan 
but had his veto overridden by a vote of 72-30 in the House and 37-14 in the Senate.97 
Supporters of the governor then filed a referendum petition subjecting the legislature’s plan to a 
statewide vote, and also launched an initiative to take redistricting out of the legislature’s hands 
altogether. The initiative would have required all of North Dakota’s legislative districts, for both 
the House and Senate, to elect only one representative, and created a bipartisan nine-member 
commission to draw the district lines.98 
Not surprisingly, the chief backers of the initiative were Governor Link, the state 
Democratic Party, and traditional Democrat allies such as organized labor and farm 
organizations.99 Democrats objected to both the boundaries of many districts, which they 
contended were unduly favorable to Republican candidates, and the multimember nature of some 
Senate and all House districts. According to Democrats, the latter feature allowed Republicans, 
who were the majority party in most of the multimember districts, to win far more seats than they 
deserved given their popular support. As the Bismarck Tribune observed, “[i]n a state which 
elected a Democratic governor and lieutenant governor as well as a state treasurer and tax 
commissioner, voters only elected 10 Democrats to the 51-member Senate and 22 Democrats to 
 
96 NORTH DAKOTA LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, supra note 94, at 5. 
97 See Chapman v. Meier, 372 F. Supp. 371, 387 (D.N.D. 1974) [Chapman II]. 
98 The House and Senate minority and majority leaders would each have appointed two commission members, and 
those eight members would then have elected the ninth member, who would have doubled as the commission’s 
chairperson.  
99 See Average Voter Little Concerned with Special Election Issues, FARGO FORUM, Oct. 28, 1973, at C4 [hereinafter 
Average Voter] (“The constitutional amendment is a virtual creation of Democratic Gov. Arthur A. Link and the 
referred measure is [subjected] to a vote of the people largely through the efforts and with the support of the 
Democratic party.”); Bill Tillottson, N.D. Voters May Decide Remap Issue, BISMARCK TRIB., Nov. 23, 1973, at 1. 
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the 102-member House.”100 The other important argument of the initiative’s supporters was that 
single-member districts would improve representatives’ accountability to their constituents. In 
Lieutenant Governor Wayne Sanstead’s words, “[s]ingle-member districts would create lines that 
would make candidates for public office come from one particular area. They would be voted on 
by a smaller number of people, thus making government more responsive to the needs of that 
area.”101 
Opposition to the initiative was concentrated in North Dakota’s Republican Party, which 
stood to lose influence if the measure passed. Republicans attacked the initiative on multiple 
grounds. The state party’s chairman, Allan C. Young, declared repeatedly that the redistricting 
commission would amount to “yet another bureaucracy that would be completely unresponsive 
to the people of North Dakota.”102 Other prominent Republicans claimed that the creation of 
single-member House and Senate districts would disrupt existing political communities and 
dilute rural influence in the state legislature.103 Also leveled at the initiative were charges that it 
was merely an effort by frustrated Democrats to seize a greater share of the political spoils,104 
100 Bill Tillottson, Amendment Backers Seek 1-Solon Units, BISMARCK TRIB., Nov. 26, 1973, at 32. 
101 Remap Plan Gets Support of Sanstead, BISMARCK TRIB., Nov. 9, 1973, at 5; see also Tillottson, supra note 100 
(paraphrasing Alton Schuette, chairman of the pro-initiative Committee for Equal Apportionment) (“If those multi-
districts could be broken up . . . with legislators more closely representing their constituents and with each voter 
having to concentrate on electing only one senator and one representative on what would be a neighborhood basis, 
equality would be achieved.”). 
102 Phil Matthews, Constitutional Amendment Draws Election Spotlight, FARGO FORUM, Oct. 29, 1973, at 3; see also 
Spokesmen Trade Views on Reapportionment Vote, BISMARCK TRIB., Nov. 16, 1973, at 7 (also quoting Young) (“I 
believe the people of North Dakota will reject the creation of yet another bureaucracy . . . with unlimited spending 
power and with responsibility to neither the executive, legislative or judicial  branch of government or to the 
people.”).  
103 See Litten Calls Remap Vote ‘Gerrymandering’ Plan, BISMARCK TRIB., Nov. 19, 1973, at 3 (quoting State 
Senator C. Warner Litten) (“When you start trying to break up the cities of Frago, Grand Forks and Minot into 
single Senate and single House districts, you will have a real gerrymandering hodge-podge.”); Bill Tillottson, Voter 
Confusion Problem for Amendment’s Foes, BISMARCK TRIB., Nov. 27, 1973, at 20 (State Senator David E. Nething 
“argues that the proposal, which also creates House subdistricts would break up rural voting patterns with a net 
result in weakening rural influence in the legislature.”). 
104 See Average Voter, supra note 99 (“Of course, if the Democrats had the majority, we could well imagine there 
would be little support from them for the proposed amendment.”); Tillottson, supra note 103 (“Democrats have been 
unable to get into the legislature in greater numbers, [State Senator Myron H.] Atkinson said, so they have tried to 
change the procedures for electing lawmakers.”). 
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that a new state census would be required if the measure passed,105 that the initiative “assumes 
that there will never be more than two parties or two factions in the legislative arena,”106 and that 
decennial redistricting might be too inflexible for a state as dynamic as North Dakota.107 Many of 
these charges were echoed by the state’s two most important newspapers, the Bismarck Tribune 
and the Fargo Forum, both of which opposed the initiative.108 
On December 4, 1973, the initiative went down to defeat with 45 percent of the vote in 
favor compared to 55 percent against. (The referendum on the legislature’s reapportionment plan 
also failed by a 53 percent to 47 percent margin.) The unified opposition of North Dakota’s 
majority party and media establishment was a key factor in the measure’s loss at the polls. The 
initiative’s critics also made more (though not necessarily better) arguments than its supporters, 
and received more attentive press coverage.109 Furthermore, Governor Link, the most important 
Democrat in the state, barely involved himself in the campaign.110 Finally, voter turnout in the 
election—in which the only items on the ballot were the redistricting initiative and the 
reapportionment referendum—was exceptionally light, a situation that typically favors the 
proponents of the status quo.111 
105 See ‘Amendment OK Means Census’, BISMARCK TRIB., Nov. 24, 1973, at 3. 
106 Average Voter, supra note 99. 
107 See Should We Lock Ourselves in?, BISMARCK TRIB., Nov. 28, 1973, at 4. 
108 See Average Voter, supra note 99 (expressing the Fargo Forum’s opposition to the initiative); Cure Worse Than 
the Ill, BISMARCK TRIB., Dec. 1, 1973, at 4 (same for the Bismarck Tribune). 
109 These claims are based on my reading all initiative-related pieces in the Fargo Forum and Bismarck Tribune.
110 I found only one newspaper article quoting Governor Link about the initiative. See No New Census Needed for 
Remap, Link Says, BISMARCK TRIB., Nov. 30, 1973, at 3. 
111 See Bill Tillottson, Light Voter Turnout Seen, BISMARCK TRIB., Dec. 3, 1973, at 1; id. (quoting State Senator 
Nething) (“I think all the publicity has confused voters more than helped them make up their minds . . . . Confusion 
usually leads to a ‘No’ vote.”).  
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5. Colorado, 1974 (Succeeded) 
Reapportionment consumed much of the Colorado state legislature’s calendar in 1972. 
Legislators took months to come up with their initial plan,112 only to see it struck down by the 
Colorado Supreme Court for violating the state constitution’s district compactness 
requirement.113 The legislature’s next map was upheld in litigation,114 but attracted attention 
because of the oddly shaped districts that it created. One district, according to Representative 
Jerry Kopel, “looked like an equatorial line on a world globe dividing the city, with portions of 
the boundaries through city parks just several yards wide.”115 That district was nicknamed the 
“Bettymander” because it was designed to weaken Representative Betty Benevidez’s hold on her 
seat.116 
In the wake of this controversial redistricting exercise, Colorado’s League of Women 
Voters proposed an initiative that would delegate district-drawing responsibilities to an eleven-
member commission. The commission would include the majority and minority leaders of both 
state legislative chambers, three members appointed by the governor, and four members 
 
112 See Amendment No. 9: Yes, DENVER POST, Oct. 22, 1974, at 22 [hereinafter Yes on 9] (“Anyone who recalls the 
1972 legislative session can affirm that legislative leaders—as well as their rank-and-file ‘troops’—were tied up for 
many weeks trying to redistrict the state . . . .”); Bob Ewegen, Reapportion Plan on Ballot, DENVER POST, Oct. 14, 
1974, at 3 (“The Colorado Legislature . . . was snarled for months in 1972 as it tried to reapportion itself . . . .”). 
113 See Acker v. Love, 496 P.2d 75 (Colo. 1972). 
114 See In re Interrogatories by the General Assembly as Propounded by House Resolution No. 1020, 497 P.2d 1024 
(Colo. 1972). 
115 Jerry Kopel – Reapportionment, http://www.jerrykopel.com/b/Reapportionment-2001.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 
2006). 
116 Id. 
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appointed by the chief justice of the Colorado Supreme Court.117 It would redistrict the state 
legislature every ten years, and craft districts that were compact, that preserved communities of 
interest, and that deviated less than 5 percent in their population.118 
The debate over the Colorado initiative was placid by comparison to the firestorms that 
enveloped similar measures in other states, both before and after 1974. Good government groups 
such as the League of Women Voters and Common Cause supported the initiative, but their main 
argument on behalf of the measure was just that it would allow the state legislature to focus on 
more important issues.119 They did not denounce the Republican Party for its 1972 gerrymander 
or emphasize the inherent unseemliness of legislative redistricting. Colorado’s main newspapers 
also devoted relatively little coverage to the initiative and expressed their (conflicting) editorial 
positions in moderate language.120 Most surprisingly, the state’s parties and prominent politicians 
were almost entirely silent about the initiative. No new organizations were formed to fight for or 
against the measure, and I did not find a single newspaper article quoting the governor or any 
major legislative figure about the initiative. In fact, the only reference to politicians’ views on the 
initiative that I was able to find came two days before the election, and merely cited unnamed 
 
117 In addition, no more than six of the eleven commissioners could come from the same political party, each 
Colorado congressional district had to have at least one commission member, and one member had to live west of 
the Continental Divide. 
118 See Ewegen, supra note 112. 
119 See Proposal 9 Backed by Common Cause, DENVER POST, Oct. 21, 1974, at 2 (“In urging a ‘yes’ vote on the 
amendment, Common Cause pointed to what it called the ‘long, haggling sessions’ by legislators ‘struggling to 
retain their own seats.’ The result is to waylay critical issues ‘no matter which party is in the majority.’”). 
120 See Vote No on Amendment Nine, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Oct. 25, 1974, at 68 [hereinafter No on 9] (“[W]e 
don’t believe this constitutional duty should be taken away from the Legislature.”); Yes on 9, supra note 112 
(“[T]his newspaper believes that the reapportionment commission can be a forward step.”). The Rocky Mountain 
News’s main arguments against the initiative were that it “dislike[d] the trend in government of appointing people to 
various boards, commissions and government positions,”  and that it would be difficult for the Colorado Supreme 
Court to evaluate fairly a map produced by a commission four members of which were appointed by the court’s 
chief justice. See No on 9, supra.
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legislators who had “come out in opposition to Amendment 9, insisting that redistricting is a job 
done best by lawmakers, using the give-and-take of the legislative process.”121 
The explanation for the campaign’s strange calm—and for the initiative’s resounding 60 
percent to 40 percent victory on election day—is that 1974 was not a normal year in the annals of 
American politics. It was, rather, the year of Watergate and of President Nixon’s resignation, and 
one of the best years ever for Democrats across the country. In Colorado, Democrats defeated an 
incumbent Republican governor, U.S. senator, state attorney general, and state treasurer, while 
also winning control of the General Assembly.122 The election’s dramatic pro-Democrat tilt 
reduced both parties’ incentives to talk much about the initiative. Republicans, sensing imminent 
electoral catastrophe, were reluctant to criticize a measure that was leading in the polls,123 and 
unable to make the argument that the initiative was an effort by sore loser Democrats to seize 
more political power. Democrats, on the other hand, did not need to lobby hard for a measure 
that was already almost sure to pass, and were more focused on the many contested candidate 
elections in 1974 than the initiative campaign. In the end, Amendment 9 cruised easily to victory 
atop the year’s pro-Democrat and pro-reform tidal wave, escaping almost unscathed from the 
attacks that typically befall redistricting initiatives. 
 
6. Ohio, 1981 (Failed) 
 
121 Suzanne Weiss, 10 Constitutional Amendments and Referred Laws on Ballot, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Nov. 3, 
1974, at Trend 3;  
122 See Leroy F. Aarons, Colorado Tide Not One of Liberalism, WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 1974, at A1 (“There is a 
strange wind blowing in the Colorado Rockies. . . . [It] achieved hurricane force last November and turned into a 
disaster for Colorado Republicans.”). 
123 See Bob Ewegen, 9 Proposals Firm, DENVER POST, Nov. 3, 1974, at 15 (noting that the redistricting initiative 
enjoyed a thirteen-point lead in October 1974, virtually unchanged from its eighteen-point lead the previous month). 
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Ohio already had a redistricting commission in place in 1981. Fourteen years earlier, the 
state legislature had passed (and Ohio’s voters had ratified) a constitutional amendment 
transferring redistricting authority for state elections to a five-member Apportionment Board.124 
However, Republicans in the early 1980s were dissatisfied with the Board because Democrats 
enjoyed a three-to-two advantage on it, and had twice used that advantage to enact pro-Democrat 
redistricting plans.125 Accordingly, the Ohio Republican Party proposed a measure that would 
have replaced the existing Board with a bipartisan commission made up of two Democrats, two 
Republicans, and a fifth member chosen by the four partisan appointees. The new commission 
would not actually have drafted district maps itself, but rather would have adopted the state and 
federal plans submitted to it in which districts were most compact, as measured by the ratio of 
districts’ area to their perimeter.126 
Ohio Republicans and good government groups were the initiative’s main backers. 
Republican Party state chairman Earl Barnes declared that “[r]egardless of whether it’s 
Republican or Democratic, I think the people are getting damned tired of gerrymandering.”127 
John Evans, the coordinator of the pro-initiative campaign, termed the proposal “innovative” and 
stated that “[b]etter government through fair and impartial redistricting is our goal.”128 
Republicans were joined in support of the measure by the League of Women Voters, Common 
 
124 See Common Cause – Independent Redistricting, http://www.commoncause.org/site/pp.asp? 
c=dkLNK1MQIwG&b=998747 (last visited March 2, 2006). The Board is made up of the governor, the auditor, the 
secretary of state, and two members appointed by legislative leaders. The Board draws House and Senate districts on 
the basis of equal population, compactness, contiguity, and respect for existing political boundaries. 
125 See Adam Clymer, Ohio G.O.P. Asks Redistricting Aided by Computer, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1981, at A13 
(quoting Ohio Republican Party chairman Earl Barnes) (“I’m not saying that if we had control of the Apportionment 
Board, we’d be pushing [the initiative] at this time.”); id. (“As they did after the 1970 census, the Democrats now 
hold a three-to-two majority on the Apportionment Board . . . .”). However, neither the 1970 nor the 1980 
reapportionments in Ohio were especially flawed. 
126 See id. Districts would also have had to vary by no more than 3 percent from the average district population. 
127 Id. 
128 See George B. Merry, Redistricting by Computer: Some Politicians Worry They’ll Lose Control, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Apr. 27, 1981, at 10. 
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Cause, and the Ohio Council of Churches.129 Together, they created a new organization, the 
Committee for Fair and Impartial Redistricting, and spent around $750,000 collecting 
signatures130 and $600,000 “on a media campaign aimed at discrediting the political methods 
currently used for apportioning districts.”131 
In opposition, Ohio Democrats accused the initiative’s backers of attempting to seize 
political influence that they had been unable to win at the ballot box. James Leahy, executive 
director of the state Democratic Party, scoffed that “[i]f they don’t like the game, they try to 
change the rules.”132 Another Democrat official, noting that Ohio had adopted its present 
Apportionment Board just fourteen years before and that Republicans had also tried and failed to 
place a similar initiative on the 1980 ballot, commented that “I’m not sure how many times you 
can build the ark, especially if it don’t flood.”133 Democrats also cited the likely consequences of 
the initiative as evidence that it was nothing but a Republican power grab; “the plan could insure 
that both of Ohio’s lost Representatives [after the 1980 census] would be Democrats. If the 
initiative fails and the politically divided Legislature does the job, each party would lose one safe 
seat.”134 Finally, Democrats attacked the initiative’ supporters for raising most of their funds 
from large corporations, and threatened those corporations with a reduction in their political 
influence if they continued their contributions.135 
129 See Clymer, supra note 125. 
130 See id. 
131 See United Press International Release, Nov. 4, 1981. 
132 See Clymer, supra note 125; see also William Carlson, Issue 2 Is Significant for Many Ohioans, PLAIN DEALER,
Oct. 12, 1981, at 20-A (“Democrats charge that the incumbent Republican or any subsequent governor would 
provide a political edge in all but the most isolated counties” because of a provision authorizing the governor to 
divide municipalities with a population greater than 5,000 into subunits for the purpose of district-drawing.); Joseph 
D. Rice, Rep. Stokes Leads Big Fight Against Remap Issue, PLAIN DEALER, Oct. 31, 1981, at 4-A (quoting black 
Ohio congressman Louis Stokes) (“It would wipe out my congressional district. There is just no way I could 
survive.”). 
133 See Clymer, supra note 125. 
134 See Adam Clymer, States Lag on Redistricting for Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1981, at B13. 
135 See William Carlson, Corporate Ethics on Issue 2 Criticized, PLAIN DEALER, Oct. 27, 1981, at 13-A; Joseph D. 
Rice & William Carlson, Dems Get Revenge on Issue 2 Backers, PLAIN DEALER, Oct. 25, 1981, at 1-A. 
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On election day, Issue 2 lost with 42 percent of the vote for versus 58 percent against—a 
somewhat surprising result given that Republicans controlled the state’s governorship as well as 
one of the two legislative chambers. The main explanation for the initiative’s defeat was 
probably the relatively tepid support that it received from the state Republican Party, compared 
to Democrats’ energetic opposition.136 Governor James Rhodes was almost entirely silent on the 
subject of the initiative.137 More importantly, Ohio’s Republican legislators were quite uneasy 
about Issue 2, which would have required the redistricting commission automatically to adopt the 
state and federal plans with the most compact districts. Compactness may be a virtue when all 
else is equal, but its elevation above all other redistricting considerations—e.g. respect for 
communities of interest and political boundaries, district continuity from one election to 
another—posed a serious threat to all incumbent legislators, Democrat and Republican.138 
7. California, 1982 (Failed) 
 
The first of four California redistricting initiatives took place in 1982. During the 
previous year’s legislative session, Democrats had pushed through a reapportionment plan that 
promised to strengthen substantially their party’s hold on both the state legislature and 
California’s congressional delegation.139 Republicans, furious at what they considered to be a 
 
136 See United Press International Release, Nov. 4, 1981 (“An elated C. Paul Tipps, chairman of the Ohio 
Democratic Party, said he believed a strong turnout across the state helped seal the defeat of Issue 2.”). 
137 See Joseph D. Rice, Rhodes Likely To Say He’s for State Issue 2, PLAIN DEALER, Oct. 28, 1981, at 11-A (noting, a 
week before the election, that the governor had not yet announced his position on the redistricting initiative, and that 
he had “publicly steered clear of the issue”).  
138 Cf. No on State Issue 2, PLAIN DEALER, Oct. 23, 1981, at 12-B (“We have difficulty accepting the idea that 
compactness . . . is the sole relevant criterion for forming districts . . . .”). 
139 See Jerry Gillam & Claudia Luther, 2 Redistricting Bills Advance, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 12, 1981, at 1 (“Democrats 
in the Legislature bulldozed down angry Republican opposition Friday night and approved reapportionment plans 
aimed at strengthening Democratic domination of the state senate and Californian seats in Congress for the next 
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blatant partisan gerrymander, initiated two direct democracy campaigns to undo the legislature’s 
handiwork. First, they obtained enough petitions to subject the three reapportionment plans (for 
the Assembly, the Senate, and the congressional delegation) to a statewide referendum. The 
referendum occurred in June 1982, and resulted in all three plans being rejected by a 63 percent 
to 37 percent margin.140 
Second, state Republicans joined forces with Common Cause to draft and promote a 
redistricting initiative. The initiative would have created a ten-member redistricting commission 
with four members appointed by the Assembly and Senate party caucuses, two members 
appointed by the major parties’ chairmen, and four members appointed by senior state appellate 
judges. The commission would have been required to draw state and federal districts that were 
compact, respectful of political subdivisions, and divergent by no more than 2 percent from the 
average district population. Any reapportionment plan would have needed the approval of seven 
commission members, including at least three of the court-appointed commissioners and one of 
each party’s appointees. If the commission deadlocked, the California Supreme Court would 
have appointed special masters to carry out the redistricting.141 
California Republicans were the 1982 initiative’s most important backers. They spent 
about $350,000 gathering signatures for the measure and another $250,000 campaigning for it,142 
and also provided most of the $200,000 budget for a pro-initiative group called Citizens for Fair 
Representation.143 Joining the Republicans in support of the initiative were an array of interest 
 
decade.”); Claudia Luther & Jerry Gillam, 3 Plans for State Redistricting OKd, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1981, at B1 
(“One Republican assemblyman likened the Democrats’ treatment of the GOP to the Holocaust of World War II 
while another accused Assembly Speaker William L. Brown Jr. . . . of killing off his political foes as does Iran’s 
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.”). 
140 See Bill Billiter & Ronald L. Soble, Voters Strongly Reject Canal, Back Prop. 8, L.A. TIMES, June 9, 1982, at 1. 
141 See Claudia Luther, New Redistricting Initiative Submitted, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1981, at B3. 
142 See Claudia Luther, Initiative To Create Redistricting Commission Qualifies for Ballot, L.A. TIMES, June 22, 
1982, at B3. 
143 See Bill Billiter, Prop. 14: Election Reform or a Trojan Horse?, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1982, at E1. 
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groups (e.g. Common Cause, the League of California Cities, the California Chamber of 
Commerce, the American Association of University Women, the California Church Council, the 
National Association of Retired Persons, and the National Association of Retired Teachers), as 
well as President Reagan and former President Ford.144 The main arguments of the initiative’s 
supporters were that a redistricting commission was the only way to prevent the Democrats from 
repeating their 1981 power grab,145 and that legislators are intrinsically unable to separate their 
personal interest from the public good during redistricting.146 
California’s Democratic Party and Democratic Governor Jerry Brown—the architects of 
the 1981 reapportionment—were the initiative’s principal opponents.147 Interestingly, few 
interest groups joined the Democrats in opposition,148 though the Los Angeles Times did come 
out against the initiative.149 Democrats spent about $250,000 campaigning against redistricting 
reform,150 and made a wide assortment of claims about the initiative. Assembly Speaker Willie 
Brown asserted that a redistricting commission would be just as roiled by partisan strife as the 
state legislature,151 and that commissions generally work no better than legislative 
redistricting.152 Assembly Democratic Caucus Leader Douglas Bosco predicted that the 
 
144 Id.; see also Citizen Reagan Signs Petition on Remapping, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1981, at A2. 
145 See Claudia Luther, GOP To Aid Remapping Reform Bid, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1981, at A3 (“[E]ven if the 
referendums succeed, Democrats—who hold majorities in both houses—have the power to enact similar 
reapportionment plans again. The most the referendums could accomplish is to keep intact the current districts . . . 
.”). 
146 See Michael Asimow & Walter Zeiman, Prop. 14: Is It Real ‘Reform’?, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1982, at E3 (“When 
it comes to drawing district lines and determining their own political fate, even the most noble legislators place 
personal and public interests over the public interest. . . .”). 
147 See Billiter, supra note 143 (“By contrast, there is no coalition or separate campaign organization for the 
opponents of Proposition 14. Almost all of the organized opposition comes from the state Democratic Party . . . .”). 
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Luther, Remapping Challenge May Be Just Warm-Up, L.A. TIMES, May 10, 1982, at B3 (claiming that organized 
labor would help run the campaign against the June referenda). 
149 See Reapportionment: No on 14, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1982, at E4 [hereinafter No on 14]. 
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commission would be composed of “a bunch of old, white, upper-middle-class men,” thus failing 
to reflect California’s diversity.153 And other Democrats argued that the commission would lack 
accountability to the public,154 and that it would be prone to deadlock because of its peculiar 
requirements for passing a reapportionment plan.155 
On November 2, 1982, the initiative was defeated by a vote of 45 percent for versus 55 
percent against. The measure’s backers actually spent more money and received more support 
from third-party groups than the initiative’s opponents, meaning that the loud and persistent 
criticism by the Democratic Party and Governor Brown was probably crucial to the measure’s 
loss at the polls. As was also the case in other initiatives, the measure’s opponents seem to have 
been more mobilized and more creative in their arguments than proponents of redistricting 
reform, enabling them to prevail in the end despite their initially inauspicious position.156 
8. California, 1984 (Failed) 
 
After the November 1982 redistricting initiative failed, the California state legislature 
passed a new reapportionment plan similar to (and just as pro-Democrat as) the one that had been 
rejected by the state’s voters in the June 1982 referendum. Angry Republicans responded by 
 
153 See Billiter, supra note 143; see also Luther, supra note 142 (paraphrasing California Democratic Party 
Chairwoman Nancy Pelosi) (“[T]he commission proposed in the initiative is structured so that it is unlikely that 
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154 See Claudia Luther & Richard Bergholz, Campaign Launched for Remap Initiative, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1982, at 
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launching another initiative, this one prescribing the actual district lines for state and federal 
elections.157 The initiative was scheduled for a December 1983 vote, and both parties began 
preparing for what one Democrat described as “the political fight of a generation.”158 However, 
the preparations were cut short by the California Supreme Court, which ruled in September that 
the initiative violated the state constitution because it would have authorized an impermissible 
second redistricting during a single decade.159 
Unfazed by the court’s decision, California Republicans drafted yet another redistricting 
initiative for the 1984 election. This initiative would have created a redistricting commission 
made up of eight retired state appellate judges, four appointed by Republican governors and four 
by Democrats.160 The commission would have formulated district maps on the basis of 
competitiveness, compactness, contiguity, and equipopulation, and then submitted the maps to 
the electorate for approval in a statewide referendum. If the commission found itself deadlocked, 
one member would have been eliminated at random to break the logjam.161 
The 1984 battle lines closely resembled those from two years earlier, except that 
Governor Jerry Brown, a Democrat, had been replaced by George Deukmejian, a Republican. 
Governor Deukmejian led the Republican effort in support of the initiative. According to one 
observer, he “devoted virtually his full-time efforts for weeks and more than $1 million in his 
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TIMES, Apr. 6, 1983, at 22. 
158 See Kevin Roderick, ‘Political Fight of Generation’ Slated, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 5, 1983, at B3 (quoting California 
Democratic Party Chairman Peter Kelly); see also John Balzarl & Douglas Shuit, Governor Orders Remapping 
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159 See Legislature of the State of California v. Deukmejian, 669 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1983). 
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personal election funds to the campaign,”162 and repeated his campaign theme, “fairness, not 
politics,” at rally after rally.163 Republicans spent $1.3 million to qualify the initiative for the 
ballot, and about $2 million more on advertisements on behalf of redistricting reform.164 As in 
1982, President Reagan and numerous pro-business groups (e.g. the California Manufacturers 
Association, the California Chamber of Commerce, the Western Growers Association) joined the 
state Republican Party in support of the initiative.165 
Democrats, not surprisingly, responded to the initiative by commencing “all-out warfare” 
against it.166 They blasted the proposed commission for “relying on a small pool of elderly, 
predominantly Republican retired appellate court judges”167 who might be influenced by 
conflicts of interest,168 for creating nominally competitive districts that would actually favor the 
Republican Party,169 and for reducing public input into the redistricting process.170 They raised 
more than $4 million to fight the initiative,171 and won the support of the Los Angeles Times172 as 
well as several groups that had largely sat out the 1982 election, such as the California AFL-CIO, 
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172 See Reapportionment: No on 39, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1984, at C4. 
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the California Trial Lawyers Association, the Mexican American Political Association, and the 
NAACP. They also mounted an extremely effective ad campaign that attacked the initiative for 
involving judges in redistricting,173 and featured actor Jack Lemmon making statements like 
“Proposition 39, it would make a great movie—money, power, back room deals with judges. 
Ohhh. But it would make one lousy law.”174 
On election day, 45 percent of the electorate supported Proposition 39 and 55 percent 
voted against it. Republicans benefited relative to 1982 from the energetic support of a popular 
governor. But, unlike in 1982, they were outspent by the initiative’s opponents and did not enjoy 
the same unified backing from third-party groups. More importantly, Democrats appear to have 
been exceptionally successful at framing the issues in the initiative campaign. Powerful anti-
initiative ads swamped Governor Deukmejian’s message about fair representation, and 
convinced voters that judges could not be trusted to conduct redistricting. The governor admitted 
the effectiveness of the commercials a month before the election,175 and observers afterwards 
concluded that “television commercials [had] a lot to do with” the initiative’s loss at the polls 
because “they play[ed] not only upon people’s rational understanding of these issues but also 
their emotions.”176 
173 See John Balzar, Brown Labels Anti-Prop. 39 Ads ‘Con Jobs’, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1984, at A3 (“[T]he anti-39 
commercials focused tightly on the fact that retired judges, not legislators, would do the reapportionment. This 
would lead to backroom judicial deals and politicization of the courts, the commercials argued.”); Douglas Shuit, 
Deukmejian Remap Effort Gets Boost in Washington, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1984, at 3 (quoting one Democrat ad) 
(“Judges would be dragged into the political back room—like Chicago and other places with political machines. 
Only political cronies would ever be appointed judge.”) 
174 William Endicott, Prop. 39 Ads Point Up Politicians’ Bad Image, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1984, at B3. 
175 See Love, supra note 163 (quoting Governor Deukmejian) (The Democrats’ ads “are considered effective by 
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9. California, 1990 (Failed) 
 
California’s next campaign over redistricting initiatives unfolded in 1990, when two 
separate reapportionment-related measures were on the ballot. The first, sponsored by 
Republican businessman Gary Flynn, would have allowed the state legislature to continue 
drawing district lines, but would have required a two-thirds vote by the Assembly and Senate as 
well as voter approval before a redistricting plan could become law.177 The second, of more 
interest here, would have created a twelve-member commission to conduct redistricting. The 
commission members would have been selected by a panel of three retired state appellate judges, 
and would have included five Democrats, five Republicans, and two independents. The 
commission would not actually have drafted district maps itself, but would have chosen among 
plans submitted to it on the basis of compactness, equal population, preservation of communities 
of interest, fair representation for minorities, and competitiveness.178 
The initiative’s supporters were a motley crew. The measure was announced by Paul 
Gann, best known as a co-sponsor of the notorious property tax-cutting Proposition 13, Alan 
Post, for three decades the state legislature’s nonpartisan budget adviser, and Ellen Elliott, a 
leader of the League of Women Voters.179 Also prominent in their support for the initiative were 
Leroy Heslop, former executive director of the California Republican Party,180 former President 
Reagan,181 major corporations such as Chevron and Hewlett Packard,182 and a handful of 
 
177 See Tim Schreiner, Broad Redistricting Plan on June Ballot, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Jan. 19, 1990, at A3. The 
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179 See id. (referring to the “curious coalition” in support of the initiative); Carl Ingram, Reapportion Plan Calls for 
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Democrats not holding elected office.183 Unlike in 1984, however, Governor Deukmejian was 
not very active in the campaign,184 and many Republican state legislators actually opposed the 
initiative because they were afraid that its competitiveness requirement would imperil their seats 
in addition to those of their Democratic opponents.185 Supporters of the measure spent $700,000 
gathering signatures186 and close to $1 million on campaign commercials,187 some of which 
featured actor Charlton Heston accusing Democrats of “conn[ing]” the public.188 The most 
common arguments made on behalf of the initiative were that it would make California’s 
elections more competitive,189 and eliminate districts that “look like pieces in an intricate jigsaw 
puzzle.”190 
California Democrats mounted a unified—and very well-funded—campaign against the 
initiative. Assembly Speaker Willie Brown led the opposition (and even promised to make 
legislative redistricting fairer if the initiative failed),191 while State Senator Bill Lockyer, civil 
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rights leader Jesse Jackson,192 and Senate President Pro Tem David Roberti also loudly criticized 
the measure. As in 1982 and 1984, Democrats accused Republicans of trying to “gain control by 
line-drawing rather than by political competition,”193 and of proposing a commission that would 
be dominated by special interests and “mostly old, white men.”194 The Democrats were joined in 
opposition to the measure by the National Organization for Women, various Hispanic groups, the 
Sierra Club, the Los Angeles Times’s editorial page,195 and, most surprisingly, Common Cause, a 
prominent good government group that initially backed the initiative but later changed its 
mind.196 Democrats and their allies also massively outspent the measure’s supporters, with 
estimates of their expenditures ranging from $5-8 million.197 This enormous war chest was used 
to fund a series of devastatingly effective commercials starring actors James Garner, Bea Arthur, 
and, in a reprise appearance, Jack Lemmon.198 
Both redistricting initiatives on the ballot were trounced at the polls, with Proposition 119 
(which would have created the commission) winning just 36 percent of the vote. As in 1984, 
Democrats’ speeches and ads convinced much of the public that the measure would have enabled 
sinister special interests to seize control of the state’s redistricting process. Bob Marks, campaign 
manager for the Yes-on-119 campaign, said that he knew his side was in trouble “when my 
mother called me up after she saw the Jim Garner ad and said ‘Are you sure I should vote for 
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this?’”199 Compared to 1984, the Democrats also enjoyed a much greater spending advantage, 
more backing from third-party groups, and, critically, a fractured opposition. As noted above, 
Governor Deukmejian was lukewarm in his support for Proposition 119 and many Republicans 
criticized the measure. At an acrimonious party conference a month after the initiative was 
defeated, conservative rebels actually submitted a resolution criticizing the “ineffectual, 
incompetent, and wasteful” campaign on behalf of the measure, and asked for an audit to 
“determine where the party’s money was spent and why it fumbled the campaign[].”200 
10. Arizona, 2000 (Succeeded) 
 
During the 1990s, Arizona’s state and federal elections were strikingly uncompetitive,201 
and complaints were raised about the strange shapes of some electoral districts.202 In 2000, a 
coalition of good government groups, the Arizona Democratic Party (long the minority in the 
state legislature), and wealthy real estate developer Jim Pedersen sought to enact redistricting 
reform. The initiative they drafted would create a five-member redistricting commission; state 
appellate judges would select a pool of twenty-five candidates, the House and Senate majority 
and minority leaders would each appoint one commission member from this pool, and the four 
partisan appointees would choose a fifth individual to be the commission’s chairperson. The 
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commission would then draft state and federal district maps on the basis of equal population, 
compactness, contiguity, respect for communities of interest, preservation of political 
boundaries, and competitiveness.203 
The redistricting initiative, Proposition 106, was supported by an unusual mix of actors. 
Arizona Democrats, not surprisingly, strongly backed the measure in hope that it would weaken 
Republicans’ grip on the state legislature and congressional delegation.204 Good government 
groups such as Common Cause and the League of Women Voters also endorsed the measure, 
seeing it as an “antidote to Arizona's checkered redistricting history.”205 These predictable 
supporters were joined by a number of prominent Republicans: former Governor Rose Mofford, 
Superintendent of Public Instruction Lisa Keegan, former Attorney General Grant Woods, 
Phoenix Mayor Skip Rimsza, State Representative Sue Gerard, etc.206 Almost every executive 
branch official in Arizona also supported the initiative,207 and the governor, Republican Jane Dee 
Hull, kept her views on redistricting reform to herself.208 Finally, Arizona’s most important 
newspaper, the Arizona Republic, maintained a steady drumbeat of support for Proposition 
106.209 From February 1999 through election day, the Republic published a series of editorials 
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with titles such as Put the Crayons Back in the Box!210 and Stop the Music on Redistricting,211 
and at one point issued a weekly “redistricting countdown” tracking the progress of the 
initiative’s backers in gathering signatures.212 Proposition 106’s supporters stressed the 
enormous advantage enjoyed by Arizona incumbents during the 1990s213 as well as the 
unseemliness of legislators custom-designing their own districts.214 
Opposition to the initiative stemmed almost entirely from Republican legislators and a 
handful of pro-business interest groups. Arizona’s five Republican congressmen criticized the 
measure because they believed it would “lack accountability to voters” and “prove less 
representative of the state as a whole.”215 State Senate Majority Leader Rusty Bowers attacked 
the initiative because, in his view, a redistricting commission would be just as political as the 
legislature but less savvy and knowledgeable about the state.216 And Arizona Republican Party 
chairman Nathan Sproul denounced Jim Pedersen, the largest contributor to the pro-initiative 
side, and described the Proposition 106 campaign as “just a small group of special interest 
individuals trying to hijack the process.”217 As mentioned above, Arizona Republicans’ 
opposition to Proposition 106 was less than unanimous, with several important party members 
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either supporting or remaining silent about the measure.218 In addition, the initiative’s foes were 
forced to raise funds from outside the state in the waning days of the campaign as they found 
themselves behind in the polls and short on cash.219 
In the end, Proposition 106 prevailed by a vote of 56 percent for to 44 percent against. 
The most significant explanation for the initiative’s success was probably the dissension within 
the Arizona Republican Party. With Governor Hull uncharacteristically taciturn and many 
Republicans voicing their support for the measure, the party was unable to mount a unified 
campaign in opposition. Why Arizona Republicans were so fractured, though, is a more vexing 
question; legislative majorities in other states have not had nearly as much difficulty maintaining 
a common front when challenged by redistricting initiatives. The answer appears to be threefold. 
First, the Arizona Republic’s extraordinary campaign on behalf of redistricting reform made the 
commission a major issue from early 1999 onward, and generated negative attention for all 
Republicans that tried to thwart it—but praise for politicians that bucked their party on the issue. 
Second, Republicans in the state legislature made the tactical mistake in 1999 of themselves 
proposing a redistricting commission, albeit one that would have been staffed by six Republicans 
and three Democrats.220 Because of this decision, party members found it difficult down the road 
to argue that commissions were intrinsically unrepresentative and susceptible to special interest 
domination. Third, it was primarily Republicans who were not legislators (e.g. mayors, state 
cabinet members) that supported the initiative. These politicians had much less to lose if the 
measure passed, and were also less susceptible to pressure from the party apparatus. 
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11. California, 2005 (Failed) 
The highest-profile redistricting initiative ever—thanks to the enthusiastic support of 
Republican Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger—recently took place in California. In the 2004 
general election, not a single incumbent in the Assembly, Senate, or California congressional 
delegation had been beaten, and not a single seat had changed parties.221 Governor 
Schwarzenegger therefore made redistricting by nonpartisan commission a central pillar of the 
reform package that he pushed in 2005. He first tried to convince the Democrat-dominated state 
legislature to enact his proposal.222 When this effort (rather predictably) failed, he ordered a 
special election in which redistricting reform and several other measures would be put to a 
statewide vote.223 
Proposition 77 would have created a three-member commission to carry out California’s 
state and federal redistricting. The state’s Judicial Council would have chosen at random a pool 
of twenty-four retired judges, the Assembly and Senate majority and minority leaders would 
each have selected three judges from the opposing party, the four legislators would then each 
have vetoed one of the remaining twelve judges, and finally the three commission members 
would have been picked randomly from the eight judges still on the list. The commission would 
have drawn districts on the basis of equal population, compactness, contiguity, and respect for 
 
221 See John Wildermuth, Some Suspect Governor’s Plan To Redraw District Lines, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Jan. 2, 
2005, at A17. 
222 See John M. Hubbell, Plan Puts Redistricting in Judges’ Hands, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Jan. 15, 2005, at B3 
(describing the constitutional amendment proposed by Republicans in the state legislature). 
223 See Jordan Rau, Governor Puts Agenda on Ballot, L.A. TIMES, June 14, 2005, at A1. 
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political boundaries, and would have been barred from considering the potential effects of 
redistricting on incumbents or political parties.224 
Governor Schwarzenegger was by far the most important proponent of Proposition 77. 
He made redistricting reform a major issue in 2005, personally involved himself in the 
initiative’s drafting, raised large amounts of money for the pro-initiative side, and campaigned 
vigorously on behalf of the measure. According to Schwarzenegger, Proposition 77 would have 
made California’s elections more competitive,225 helped more moderate politicians at the 
expense of extremists on both ends of the political spectrum,226 and returned California to the 
widely respected judge-drawn districts that the state enjoyed in the 1990s.227 Several important 
organizations joined Schwarzenegger in support of the initiative, including Citizens To Save 
California,228 the Rose Institute,229 Common Cause,230 and various business interests. Both the 
Los Angeles Times231 and the San Francisco Chronicle232 also endorsed Proposition 77. 
Together, Schwarzenegger and his allies spent approximately $5 million on advertising and other 
campaign activities.233 
224 See John Wildermuth, Redistricting Initiative Would Set State Apart, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Oct. 7, 2005, at 
B3. 
225 See Wildermuth, supra note 221 (“‘I think we have to do a redistricting’ to make the elections more competitive, 
Schwarzenegger said. ‘I think this is a very, very important thing that we have to make part of our reforms.’”). 
226 See id. (“[T]he governor is trying to put more moderate Republicans in office at the expense of conservatives . . . 
.”). 
227 See Nancy Vogel, Looking To Design a Fairer Map, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2005, at B1 (referring to the “rosy 
rearview glow of California’s judge-drawn lines in the 1990s”); id. (quoting a Rose Institute official) (“We had 10 
years of really good districts, and people saw that it was possible for an unbiased source to draw [them].”). 
228 See Peter Nicholas, Group To Aid Gov.’s Push for Reforms, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2005, at B1. Citizens To Save 
California was an umbrella organization dedicated to promoting all of Governor Schwarzenegger’s 2005 initiatives. 
229 See Vogel, supra note 227. 
230 See Carla Marinucci & John Wildermuth, Prop. 77 Splits Common Cause in State, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Oct. 
18, 2005, at B2. However, several board members of the California chapter of Common Cause opposed the national 
organization’s decision to endorse Proposition 77. See id. 
231 See A New Political Landscape, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2005, at M4. 
232 See The Chronicle Recommends: Prop. 77, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Oct. 12, 2005, at B8. 
233 See Dan Morain, Redistricting Drama Adds a Producer, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2005, at B4. 
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A coalition of California Democrats, traditionally pro-Democrat groups, and skeptical 
Republicans opposed Proposition 77. Some of the most vocal Democrat critics were U.S. House 
Representatives Nancy Pelosi234 and Howard Berman,235 both of whom raised significant sums 
to defeat the measure. Groups that came out against the initiative included the Alliance for a 
Better California,236 the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund,237 the California 
Teachers Association, the California State Council of Service Employees, and other major 
unions.238 Most notably, a number of prominent California Republicans publicly broke with 
Governor Schwarzenegger over Proposition 77. U.S. House Representative John Doolittle 
declared that “[a]s a conservative Republican, it makes me very nervous when I hear people say 
that their overt objective is to remove the conservatives.”239 The national Republican Party also 
opposed the initiative, and by some counts sixteen of California’s twenty Republicans in 
Congress disagreed with Schwarzenegger about redistricting reform.240 The opponents of 
Proposition 77 dramatically outspent the measure’s supporters.241 Their arguments focused on 
the impossibility of removing politics from the redistricting process,242 the impropriety of 
 
234 See Christian Berthelsen, Group Backing Remap Initiative Caught up in Donations Dispute, SAN FRANCISCO 
CHRON., Oct. 7, 2005, at B3 (quoting Pelosi) (“I am very committed to defeating Proposition 77, and I am raising 
money to defeat it.”); Hubbell, supra note 222. 
235 See John Wildermuth, Incumbents Team up To Oppose Schwarzenegger on Prop. 77, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., 
Aug. 26, 2005, at B1. 
236 See Dan Morain, Coffers Bulging for Special Election, L.A. TIMES, May 3, 2005, at B1. Alliance for a Better 
California, dedicated to defeating all of Schwarzenegger’s 2005 initiatives, was the Democrat counterpart to 
Citizens To Save California. 
237 See John Wildermuth, Debate on Prop. 77 over Retired Judges, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Oct. 17, 2005, at B1. 
238 See John Wildermuth, Business, Labor Ante up in Play for Power, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Sept. 26, 2005, at 
A1 (“California public employee unions, fighting for their political lives, are betting more than $60 million that they 
can defeat Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger’s package of initiatives Nov. 8.”). 
239 See Peter Nicholas, GOP Fears a Redistricting Backfire, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2005, at A1. 
240 See id.; see also Wildermuth, supra note 235 (“Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger also faces a revolt from GOP 
congress members worried that the initiative could cost them their seats.”). 
241 See Morain, supra note 233; Wildermuth, supra note 238. 
242 See Peter Nicholas, Gov. To Call for Special Session, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2005, at A1 (quoting Assembly Speaker 
Fabian Nunez) (“You'll never be able to rid [redistricting] of politics.”). 
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conducting a second, mid-decade redistricting,243 the sense that the initiative was nothing more 
than a “power grab by the party that’s not in power,”244 the difficulty of implementing the 
initiative’s proposals in time for the 2006 election,245 and the fear that the national Democratic 
Party would be hurt if the measure passed and California Democrats lost seats in Congress as a 
result.246 
Proposition 77 lost by a wide margin on election day, with 40 percent of the vote in favor 
compared to 60 percent against. As in previous California initiative campaigns, the unified and 
forceful opposition of the state Democratic Party framed the debate as a partisan struggle rather 
than a question of good government. The measure’s prospects were also damaged by the 
dissension within the California Republican Party. While almost every major Democrat loudly 
criticized the initiative, many Republicans remained silent or joined the disparaging Democratic 
chorus. Governor Schwarzenegger did enthusiastically back Proposition 77, but previous 
California campaigns show that gubernatorial support alone does not ensure a measure’s 
passage. Moreover, Schwarzenegger’s once sky-high approval ratings had plummeted by 
November 2005, thus further reducing his influence over the electorate. As one observer 
commented just before the election, “[t]here’s a negative drag created by Arnold that spans 
 
243 See Hubbell, supra note 222 (quoting Representative Pelosi) (“[I]t’s up to the public to ask why the governor 
would want to do this in mid-decade. That is a question fraught with meaning.”). 
244 See Vogel, supra note 227 (quoting Speaker Nunez); see also John Wildermuth, ‘Nonpartisan’ Measure Draws 
Partisan Debate, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Sept. 27, 2005, at B2 (quoting State Senator Gloria Romero) (“One party 
is trying to get more control, and another party is trying to defend against it.”). 
245 See Wildermuth, supra note 244 (quoting election expert Karin MacDonald) (“It would be incredibly difficult, if 
not impossible, to get this done before Dec. 30.”). 
246 See Ethan Rarick, Learning To Love Gerrymandering, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2005, at M5 (“I will support a 
nonpartisan redistricting of Democrat-dominated California on the same day I can be assured of similar fairness in 
Republican states.”). 
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across all of the propositions that he’s supporting, and it doesn’t leave a lot of room for him to 
move.”247 
12. Ohio, 2005 (Failed) 
 
The last of the twelve redistricting initiatives took place in Ohio in 2005. In the previous 
year’s election, Ohio Democrats had won 49 percent of the congressional vote but just 33 percent 
of the seats, 48 percent of the state House vote but just 42 percent of the seats, and 37 percent of 
the state Senate vote but just 19 percent of the seats.248 Moreover, the average margin of victory 
in Ohio’s state and federal races was 35 percentage points.249 In response to these perceived 
electoral flaws, a group called Reform Ohio Now proposed an initiative that would have created 
a new five-member redistricting commission for Ohio. Senior state court judges of different 
party affiliations would have chosen the first two commission members, and those two 
commissioners would have selected the remaining three members (one Democrat, one 
Republican, and one independent). The commission would have adopted the state and federal 
district maps that created the most competitive districts, except that plans that sacrificed some 
competitiveness for greater compactness and community preservation could be chosen.250 
Reform Ohio Now, the main backer of the redistricting initiative (Issue 4) as well as three 
other propositions on the 2005 ballot, was a “nonprofit coalition of mostly moderate and liberal-
 
247 See Philip Matier & Andrew Ross, Governor Losing His Star Power in Special Election, SAN FRANCISCO 
CHRON., Oct. 31, 2005, at B1. 
248 See Joe Hallett, Ohio Ballot Issue 4: Redistricting Comes Under Scrutiny, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Oct. 27, 2005, 
at 01A. 
249 See There Is a Better Way, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Aug. 7, 2005, at 04B. 
250 See Hallett, supra note 248 (“The commission could accept a plan that scores two points lower on the 
competitiveness scale for congressional districts and four points lower for legislative districts if the plan does a 
better job of making the districts compact and keeps communities intact.”); Joe Hallett, Reform Would Wrest Pen of 
Power from State’s Political Line-Drawers, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, June 26, 2005, at 01C. 
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leaning interests.”251 It was funded primarily by foundations and individual donors (many of 
them from outside Ohio),252 and endorsed by groups such as Common Cause, the AFL-CIO and 
other unions, the NAACP, and the Sierra Club.253 Ohio’s Democratic legislators were also 
nominally in favor of Issue 4,254 but were not especially vocal in their support, probably because 
more competitive districts would have put their own seats in play in addition to those of their 
Republican opponents.255 The initiative’s backers highlighted Ohio’s history of uncompetitive 
races and argued that the ethical scandals surrounding Republican Governor Robert Taft were 
evidence of the need for redistricting reform.256 A typical commercial intoned that “[t]here’s a 
culture of corruption in our government” and claimed that Issue 4 would “help get rid of the 
special interest money, hold the politicians accountable and clean up the corruption once and for 
all.”257 
Ohio’s Republicans furiously opposed Issue 4, forming a new organization, Ohio First, to 
direct the effort against the measure. Because of his poor poll numbers, Governor Taft kept a 
relatively low profile during the campaign, but prominent legislators such as House Speaker Jon 
Husted, State Senator Kevin Coughlin, and State Representative Kevin DeWine loudly 
 
251 Jim Siegel, Group Pushing Election Reform Inches Closer to Ballot, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, July 22, 2005, at 
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254 See There Is a Better Way, supra note 249 (“Naturally, Ohio Democrats favor reform.”). 
255 See Jim Siegel, Redistricting Amendment: Proposal Could Mean Fewer Black Legislators, COLUMBUS 
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256 See Hallett, supra note 250 (quoting Erin Bowser, director of the Ohio Public Interest Research Group) (“All of 
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257 Bureaucrats Bad; So Are Politicians, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Nov. 3, 2005, at 9C. 
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denounced the initiative.258 Thanks to intense fundraising and support from pro-business groups 
such as the Ohio Chamber of Commerce,259 opponents of Issue 4 substantially outspent the 
measure’s backers.260 They used their war chest to assemble a large team of consultants 
(including the producers of the anti-John Kerry Swift Boat ads) and bombard the Ohio airwaves 
with critical commercials.261 The main themes sounded by the ads were that Issue 4 was put on 
the ballot by “wealthy, out-of-state liberals trying to hijack Ohio’s elections,”262 and that the 
initiative would transfer control of redistricting to faceless bureaucrats.263 Opponents of Issue 4 
also argued that it was a mistake to privilege competitiveness above other redistricting criteria, 
proving their point by producing a sample district map with “districts shaped like string beans” 
that the new commission would be required to adopt because of its high competitiveness 
score.264 Most of Ohio’s newspapers joined Republicans in calling for a ‘No’ vote on Issue 4.265 
On November 8, 2005, Issue 4 lost with just 30 percent of the vote for compared to 70 
percent against—the worst defeat of any of the twelve redistricting initiatives. Following a sort 
of political Murphy’s Law, almost everything that could go wrong did go wrong for the measure. 
 
258 See Hallett, supra note 250; Siegel, supra note 251. Coughlin even “admitted telling another lobbyist that he 
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Issue 4’s natural supporters, Ohio Democrats, were lukewarm in their advocacy because of 
concern about how their own reelection chances might be affected if the initiative passed. 
Reform Ohio Now was easily dismissed as a collection of out-of-state liberals. The initiative’s 
critics were well-organized and well-funded, and their media barrage was considered to have 
been particularly effective. And turnout on election day was low, particularly in Ohio’s cities, as 
voters confused by the complicated initiatives and reluctant to participate in a special election 
stayed home.266 
III. PATTERNS AND LESSONS 
In seventy years of effort, four redistricting initiatives have succeeded and eight have 
failed. Part II described in detail all twelve initiatives, and posited some explanations for why 
each one passed or was defeated. This section considers the measures collectively rather than 
individually, and attempts to reach some broader conclusions about why redistricting initiatives 
succeed or fail, what reformers can do to make success more likely in the future, and how 
accurately the academic literature explains the initiatives’ outcomes. 
 
A. Patterns in the Past 
 
Redistricting initiatives’ odds of passage are actually worse than they seem. In total, four 
out of twelve have prevailed at the polls, but two of those successes—Arkansas (1936) and 
 
266 See Sandy Theis & Reginald Fields, Scandals Get Little Reaction on Issues, PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 9, 2005, at B1 
(“[L]ow turnout in the cities indicated that Democrats failed to get their supporters to the polls. Others blamed voter 
confusion and said [Reform Ohio Now] made a mistake by pitching four complex issues at once.”). 
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Oklahoma (1962)—took place before or around the time of Baker v. Carr.267 Those measures’ 
supporters, unlike backers of redistricting reform in the forty years since Baker, were able to 
point out the obvious unfairness of electoral districts that vary widely in population. They did not 
have to resort to the second-order argument that even when the one-person, one-vote principle is 
respected, democratic values can still be subverted by clever district-drawing. In the post-Baker 
era, only two out of nine redistricting initiatives have succeeded, compared to two out of three in 
the period before the Supreme Court entered the political thicket. 
 As a group, the campaigns over the failed redistricting initiatives were quite different 
from the campaigns over the successful measures. As Appendix B, infra, indicates, the 
initiatives’ proponents were outspent in four of the seven failed campaigns for which I have 
information, but had greater resources than their adversaries in the one successful campaign for 
which an assessment is possible.268 The state governor twice opposed the initiative in failed 
campaigns but never fought against a successful initiative. The majority party in the state 
legislature strongly opposed all eight failed initiatives, but never vigorously resisted a successful 
initiative. (In the three successful campaigns for which I have information, the legislative 
majority party was split once and weakly opposed to the initiative twice.)269 The minority party 
in the state legislature was split twice and weakly in favor thrice in the failed campaigns, but 
supported all three of the successful measures for which I have information.270 In failed 
campaigns, major newspapers supported the initiative twice, opposed it four times, and were split 
twice, while in successful campaigns they endorsed the measure thrice and were split once.271 
267 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
268 See infra Appendix B. 
269 See id. 
270 See id. However, the intensity of support from the state legislative minority party varied in the successful 
initiative campaigns. 
271 See id. 
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Interest groups were split six times and supportive of the measure twice in failed campaigns, but 
were split just once and supportive twice in successful campaigns.272 All of the successful 
campaigns unfolded in the wake of a recent egregious gerrymander, and twice they took place in 
the shadow of important relevant national developments; on the other hand, one of the failed 
campaigns was not provoked by an especially awful gerrymander, and none of them were 
accompanied by major national events.273 Finally, opponents of redistricting reform were more 
effective at framing the debate in seven of the failed campaigns but none of the successful 
campaigns.274 
The (rather intuitive) upshot is that redistricting initiatives are more likely to succeed 
when their supporters outspend and outframe the opposition, the legislative majority party is split 
or weakly opposed, the governor and the legislative minority party are strongly supportive, 
newspapers and interest groups endorse the measure, a blatant gerrymander has recently 
occurred, and favorable developments are transpiring on the national stage. But it is possible to 
advance this analysis further. First, state governors are basically powerless to get a redistricting 
initiative to pass (though they may be able to accomplish the reverse, that is, to ensure a 
measure’s defeat through their energetic opposition). In three cases—Oklahoma (1960), 
California (1984), and California (2005)—governors made the passage of a redistricting measure 
their top campaign priority, only to see those initiatives lose by an average of twenty points. 
Moreover, none of the four successful initiatives enjoyed strong gubernatorial support; only 
once, in Oklahoma (1962), was the governor’s favorable position clear from newspaper 
coverage, and even in that campaign Governor Edmondson was a lame duck and devoted little 
effort to passing the initiative. 
 
272 See id. 
273 See id. 
274 See id. 
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Second, the minority party in the state legislature is similarly incapable of propelling a 
redistricting initiative to success at the polls. The minority party strongly supported a 
redistricting measure four times275 and weakly supported such a measure five more times,276 yet 
only three of those initiatives succeeded. And in the three successful cases, the minority party’s 
support for the initiative was weak twice—Oklahoma (1962) and Colorado (1974)—and strong 
only in Arizona (2000), a campaign in which the Republicans’ internal strife was probably more 
important than the Democrats’ unified advocacy. However, actual splits in (as opposed to 
lukewarm support from) the minority party correlate perfectly with defeat on election day. 
California Republicans divided over the 1990 and 2005 redistricting initiatives, and those 
measures lost by twenty-eight and twenty points, respectively. 
 Third, the actual content of a redistricting initiative also has little impact on the measure’s 
fate at the polls; the eight failed proposals do not look appreciably different from the four that 
passed. Oklahoma’s successful 1962 initiative, for example, was almost identical to the measure 
that the state’s voters rejected in 1960. Similarly, the successful initiatives in Colorado (1974) 
and Arizona (2000)—both of which created commissions that draw districts on the basis of a set 
of familiar redistricting criteria—strongly resemble the failed initiatives in California (1982), 
California (1984), California (1990), and California (2005). The only conclusion that can be 
drawn about initiatives’ content is that relatively unorthodox proposals are certain to fail. Ohio’s 
1981 initiative, which would have required the commission to adopt the plans with the greatest 
district compactness, and Ohio’s 2005 initiative, which would have privileged competitiveness 
above all other redistricting criteria, were defeated by an average of twenty-eight points. 
 
275 These cases were North Dakota (1973), California (1982), California (1984), and Arizona (2000). 
276 These cases were Oklahoma (1960), Oklahoma (1962), Colorado (1974), Ohio (1981), and Ohio (2005). 
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Two more factors that seem relatively unimportant in explaining initiative success or 
failure are interest group positions and recent egregious gerrymanders. In most campaigns—
seven of the eleven that I was able to assess—important interests lined up on both sides of the 
measure, making their overall influence a wash. In the four campaigns in which most interests 
backed one side (always the pro-initiative side), the measures passed twice and were defeated 
twice. And those two successes—Colorado (1974) and Arizona (2000)—were almost certainly 
not attributable to interest groups’ endorsements or mobilization, which by all accounts played a 
small role in both campaigns. As for glaring gerrymanders, they are unfortunately so prevalent 
that they provide no meaningful distinction between successful and unsuccessful redistricting 
initiatives. Seven of the eight failed initiatives took place shortly after an especially offensive 
redistricting exercise, as did all four of the initiatives that prevailed. 
 So what factors do account for why some initiatives succeed and some fail? The most 
important single variable appears to be the intensity of the legislative majority party’s opposition 
to the measure. In the eight cases where the majority party strongly opposed an initiative, the 
initiative failed every time. But in the four cases where the majority party’s position was unclear 
or split or only weakly opposed, the initiative succeeded every time. This finding makes a good 
deal of sense. Legislators from the majority party in a state are the main targets of redistricting 
initiatives (as well as the primary beneficiaries of the gerrymandered status quo). They are also 
members of the party that most of the electorate supports, at least in legislative elections.277 So it 
is not surprising that the majority party in the state legislature vehemently opposes most 
redistricting initiatives, or that those initiatives fail as a result of its strident opposition. 
 
277 This assumes that the existing gerrymandering is not so egregious that the majority party in the state legislature 
only enjoys the support of a minority of the electorate. In none of the twelve cases does such minority entrenchment 
appear to have occurred. 
64
But it is not just the fact of intense majority party resistance that dooms initiatives, but 
also the kind of campaign that the resistance engenders. In case after case, majority party 
legislators responded to a threatening redistricting measure by raising large sums of money, 
campaigning furiously against the measure, and striving to frame the debate in the most 
advantageous possible terms. As Appendix B shows, when the majority party strongly opposed a 
redistricting initiative, it outspent the measure’s supporters four times and was outspent thrice, 
and was more effective at framing the debate six times, while never allowing the other side 
clearly to seize the rhetorical advantage.278 This means that strong majority party opposition 
produces a political environment in which proponents of redistricting reform face almost 
insurmountable obstacles. They are confronted not only by the official hostility of the largest 
partisan entity in the state, but also by an anti-initiative effort that is better-funded, able to call on 
more prominent politicians as spokesmen, and made up of legislators desperately fighting for 
their political lives. 
 The deeper mystery, then, is why redistricting initiatives ever win—or, which is to say 
the same thing, why the state majority party does not always strongly oppose such measures. The 
answer is that while the majority party would always like to fight forcefully against redistricting 
reform, forces beyond its control sometimes prevent it from doing so. In Oklahoma (1962) and 
Colorado (1974), it was important national developments that interceded. The Supreme Court’s 
decision in Baker v. Carr made it clear to Oklahoma Democrats that reapportionment could no 
longer be resisted. Even if they thwarted both the 1962 initiative and similar proposals in the 
state legislature, reapportionment would still take place, just by court decree instead of 
democratic decision-making. Accordingly, the Oklahoma Democratic Party barely even tried to 
fight the 1962 initiative even though two years earlier it had ferociously opposed an almost 
 
278 See infra Appendix B. 
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identical measure. Similarly, Colorado Republicans in 1974 recognized the threat that the 
redistricting initiative posed to their dominance in the state legislature. But they also realized that 
the 1974 elections, taking place shortly after the Watergate scandal, would be exceptionally 
favorable to Democrats and self-proclaimed reformers. They therefore muted their opposition—
which would have been futile anyway—to the initiative, and focused on holding onto their seats. 
 There were no comparably important national developments in 2000, but the Arizona 
Republican Party still failed strongly to oppose the redistricting initiative on the ballot.279 There 
is no single explanation for the party’s halfhearted resistance; it appears, rather, to have stemmed 
from an unusual confluence of factors. First, Arizona Republicans themselves had earlier 
proposed a redistricting commission, making it difficult for them to argue convincingly against 
the initiative. Second, a number of prominent Republican executive branch officials declared 
their support for the measure, thus hampering legislators’ effort to present a vigorous and unified 
opposition front. Third, and perhaps most importantly, the Arizona Republic tirelessly 
editorialized in favor of the initiative and criticized the measure’s opponents. Newspapers in 
other states also endorsed redistricting initiatives, but the persistence and high profile of the 
Republic’s campaign were unique among the twelve cases that I examined.280 
It is now possible to answer this Article’s motivating question: Why do redistricting 
initiatives succeed and why do they fail? In short, redistricting initiatives generally fail because 
they provoke fierce opposition from the majority party in the state legislature, which feels 
threatened by the possibility of fairer district lines. The majority party typically raises more 
 
279 The Arizona case is the most inexplicable of the twelve, as an initiative that benefited Democrats passed despite 
Republican control of the governorship and both chambers of the state legislature. I should note that I do not find my 
explanation for weak Republican opposition completely convincing. Majority parties in other cases faced political 
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initiatives. 
280 In no other case did newspaper support for a measure play nearly as large a role as Arizona (2000). However, 
newspaper opposition helped doom initiatives in North Dakota (1973), California (1982), California (1984), and 
Ohio (2005).  
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money than the initiative’s supporters, argues more creatively and vociferously for its position, 
and manages to cast the debate in a light more favorable to it. On the other hand, redistricting 
initiatives succeed when for some reason the legislative majority party is unable to mobilize in 
opposition. Sometimes national developments such as Supreme Court decisions or political 
groundswells account for this inability; sometimes local factors such as media coverage or poor 
tactical decisions by the majority party are responsible. The default, unfortunately, is that 
redistricting initiatives fail, and something out of the ordinary must transpire for them to prevail 
at the polls. 
 
B. Lessons for the Future 
 
The above analysis of the twelve redistricting initiatives suggests that the situation for 
would-be reformers is dire. In general, any measure that they draft—no matter how well-written, 
no matter how admirable in its policy implications—will be defeated. The majority party in the 
state legislature will rally against the initiative, and reformers will be outspent, outframed, 
outcampaigned, and, ultimately, outvoted. It matters little whether the governor supports the 
measure, whether newspapers and interest groups are in favor, or whether the existing electoral 
districts undermine everything that democracy stands for. The outcome of the campaign will still 
be the same: failure. 
 But there are a few glimmers of hope for proponents of redistricting reform. First, and 
most importantly, history shows that redistricting initiatives do succeed when they are launched 
at the same time that favorable national developments are taking place. The challenge, then, is to 
identify propitious moments for reform in the future. Unfortunately, such moments are more 
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apparent with the benefit of hindsight, but it does seem like we may currently be on the verge of 
one. Thanks to the California and Ohio initiatives in 2005, the uproar over Texas’s mid-decade 
redistricting, and the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Vieth v. Jubelirer281 and LULAC v. 
Perry,282 redistricting is in the news more than ever before. Moreover, though it is still too early 
to tell for sure, the 2006 elections look like they will be very favorable for Democrats283—who, 
outside of California, have been the main supporters of redistricting reform in the modern era. 
The combination of greater public awareness of redistricting abuses and a pro-Democrat political 
environment may produce an unusually auspicious setting for redistricting initiatives. If current 
trends hold, reformers should be sure not to let the opportunity slip away. 
 What happens if, as will usually be the case, there are no favorable national 
developments but a redistricting initiative is nevertheless on a state’s ballot? In such a situation, 
reformers should learn as much as possible from the 2000 Arizona campaign, the one modern 
case in which a redistricting initiative prevailed despite the absence of any dramatic national 
events. One lesson from Arizona is that reformers should try not only to win major newspapers’ 
endorsements, but also to garner their committed and vocal support. An unrelenting editorial 
campaign on behalf of an initiative, like that mounted by the Arizona Republic in 2000, has the 
capacity to focus the public’s attention on redistricting and embarrass opponents of the measure. 
Media backing is especially important for proponents of redistricting reform since they are 
typically at a disadvantage when it comes to conventional campaigning and television 
advertising. 
 
281 541 U.S. 267 (2004). 
282 126 S. Ct. 2594 (2006). 
283 See Dan Balz, Issues That Will Shape the 2006 Elections, Wash. Post, July 24, 2006, at A01 (“Less than four 
months before the mid-term elections, there is one question that is preoccupying candidates around the country: 
How big will the Republican losses be in November? History suggests, and operatives in both parties agree, that 
Republicans are virtually certain to lose ground.”). 
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A second lesson from Arizona is that it is vitally important for an initiative’s supporters 
to create rifts in the legislative majority party. State legislators from the majority party are, of 
course, the politicians least likely to back a redistricting measure, but they may be convinced to 
do so if they hold seats that would be safe under virtually any electoral arrangement, or if they 
are unusually reform-minded. Several Republican members of the Arizona state legislature, for 
instance, came out in support of Proposition 106 in 2000.284 A more promising way for reformers 
to sow dissension in the majority party’s ranks, though, is to target the party’s current and former 
executive branch officials. Such officials have much less to lose than state legislators if 
redistricting is entrusted to a neutral commission, and they are also more likely to buck the party 
establishment, especially if they no longer hold elected office. The most important Republican 
supporters of Proposition 106 in 2000 were all past and present executive branch officials. 
 A final bit of advice for reformers, derived from the failed campaigns of Ohio (1981), 
California (1990), California (2005), and Ohio (2005), is that they must at all costs maintain 
unity in the legislative minority party. In those four races, whatever hopes the initiatives’ backers 
had were dashed by tepid support from, or outright splits in, the minority party.285 Unfortunately, 
the best way to prevent minority party defection is for reformers to propose measures that are 
unthreatening to minority party politicians—and hence less likely to produce genuinely fair 
district maps. The common theme in the four cases above is that each measure would have 
imperiled the seats not only of majority party legislators, but also of many minority party 
politicians. The 1981 Ohio initiative would have made district compactness the sole redistricting 
 
284 See Right of Citizens, supra note 214 (noting that Republican State Senator Sue Grace and State Representative 
Susan Gerard supported the Arizona redistricting initiative). 
285 It is true that legislative minority party support for redistricting reform was also weak in Oklahoma (1962) and 
Colorado (1974), but the initiatives nevertheless passed. However, this is almost certainly because the major 
national developments in each case made the intensity of local party support almost irrelevant. In more typical 
campaigns, the absence of minority party mobilization does indeed always prove fatal to an initiative’s chances. 
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criterion; the 1990 California initiative would have required the commission to consider district 
competitiveness when choosing among plans; the 2005 California initiative would have barred 
the commission from examining the party affiliations or voting histories of the electorate; and the 
2005 Ohio initiative would have made competitiveness the most important factor in redistricting. 
Reformers, then, should avoid proposing schemes that promise to change most districts’ shapes 
(as the 1981 Ohio initiative would have), or to make reelection more difficult for minority party 
legislators (as the other three measures would have). The proposals that are left may seem 
watered-down, but they would still dramatically improve the status quo—and, crucially, have a 
prayer of passing.  
 In sum, the playbook for advocates of redistricting reform should read as follows: Wait 
for favorable national developments to take place, and launch redistricting initiatives in their 
wake. If a measure is not buoyed by important national events, try to win the enthusiastic support 
of major newspapers, to peel off some members of the legislative majority party in the state, and 
to avoid proposals that are overly threatening to minority party legislators’ job security. Even if 
all these goals are met, of course, the initiative may fail. But at least reformers will have learned 
the right lessons from the few successful initiative campaigns, and avoided repeating all the 
mistakes of the eight failed campaigns—not one of which featured a unified minority party, a 
divided majority party, and support for the measure from the state’s media establishment. 
 
C. Implications for the Academic Conventional Wisdom 
Section II.A, supra, presented the variables that, according to political scientists, best 
explain the outcomes of popular initiatives. These variables include campaign spending, 
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especially when deployed against a measure; voters’ appraisal of a measure’s merits; the 
positions taken by elites, in particular interest groups and the media; and the framing of a 
measure by its supporters and detractors. On the other hand, political scientists tend to downplay 
the importance of political parties, arguing that parties rarely take positions on initiatives and that 
voters in initiative elections are deprived of the partisan cues that assist their decision-making in 
candidate elections.286 How accurate is the academic conventional wisdom on initiative 
outcomes (at least in the redistricting context)? 
 Not very. First, several of the factors identified as significant by political scientists are 
unhelpful in explaining why redistricting initiatives succeed or fail. For instance, initiative 
supporters outspent opponents in at least four campaigns but prevailed in only one of those 
cases.287 (Though, as scholars would expect, every time that a redistricting measure’s opponents 
were better-funded, the measure was defeated.) Initiatives’ merits also could not have played too 
large a causal role since all twelve of the measures were relatively similar—seeking to combat 
gerrymandering by creating redistricting commissions that would draw district lines on the basis 
of specified criteria—but their fates at the polls diverged widely. As noted above, the Oklahoma 
(1960) and Oklahoma (1962) initiatives were almost identical, but the former passed while the 
latter was defeated; and the successful initiatives in Colorado (1974) and Arizona (2000) closely 
resembled the four failed California initiatives. Interest group and media positions seem 
 
286 See supra note 50. The scholarly consensus on political parties is not absolute, though. Regina Branton, for 
example, analyzed initiative outcomes across a range of states and issues, and found that there is a “more general 
relationship between partisanship and voting behavior in ballot elections than previously hypothesized,” and that 
“although [initiative] elections lack traditional partisan labels, voters rely on cues to formulate a decision on ballot 
initiatives.” Regina P. Branton, Examining Individual-Level Voting Behavior on State Ballot Propositions, 56 POL.
RESEARCH Q. 367, 368, 372 (2003); see also Hasen, supra note 50, at 734 (“[P]arties no longer are passive 
observers of the initiative process. . . . Though it would be premature to consider parties as ‘major players’ in the 
process, the data show that parties are highly adaptable organizations, making selective use of initiative campaigns 
as part of their set of political tools.”). 
287 See infra Appendix B. In the one campaign where a redistricting initiative’s supporters clearly outspent its 
opponents, Oklahoma (1962), the extra funding was almost certainly not decisive. As discussed above, see supra 
Part II.B.3, the Supreme Court’s one-person, one-vote decision earlier that year was the most important reason why 
that measure passed. 
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relatively unimportant as well, since initiatives usually fail even when strongly backed by major 
groups and newspapers. Arizona (2000) is the only case where media support for a measure was 
an important reason for success at the polls, and it must be weighed against Oklahoma (1960), 
Ohio (1981), California (1982), and California (2005), all cases where initiatives were defeated 
despite strong interest group and newspaper backing. 
Not only are the variables identified by political scientists unable to explain the outcomes 
of redistricting initiative elections, but the most important causal factor—the position of the 
legislative majority party, and the intensity with which it is held—is one that the academic 
literature typically neglects. This Article’s analysis of the twelve redistricting initiatives shows 
that the measures universally failed when they were strongly opposed by the majority party in 
the state, and universally succeeded when the majority party was split or only weakly opposed. 
This finding would come as a complete surprise to observers such as Cronin, Magleby, Gerber, 
and Lupia, all of whom argue that the absence of obvious partisan cues in initiative elections 
deprives parties of their usual electoral clout.288 These scholars (along with most of the political 
science establishment) believe that parties do not matter in initiative elections, but not only do 
parties matter in the redistricting context, they matter more than any other variable. 
There are three reasons why the academic conventional wisdom is so wrong about 
redistricting initiatives. First, and most importantly, redistricting initiatives are fundamentally 
different from other exercises in direct democracy because they are designed to upset the 
political balance of power. Political scientists may be right that parties do not get too exercised 
over fiscal or environmental or legal initiatives, but it stands to reason that they will be far more 
involved in campaigns over measures that could sharply enhance or undercut their political 
prospects. Other interest groups also have less at stake in redistricting initiative elections, 
 
288 See supra note 50. 
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meaning that it is easier for parties to assume the lead role in the debate. Second, political 
scientists are inclined to minimize the relevance of political parties across all initiative contexts. 
If this perspective is flawed and parties are generally more influential than was previously 
thought to be the case, as some recent evidence suggests,289 the error will be especially severe in 
the arena where parties have the most to gain and lose. Third, no political scientist has ever 
conducted a detailed analysis of all the redistricting initiatives that have taken place over the 
course of American history. (Nor, to be fair, has anybody else.) But without such an analysis it is 
impossible to assess accurately the importance of political parties in redistricting initiative 
elections—especially since party positions and the manner in which they influence campaigns 
are not very susceptible to quantification and statistical study. This Article’s methodology, and 
the unexpected results it produced, thus suggest a need for more case study-style investigations 
of popular initiatives (and other political science phenomena as well). Case studies tend to be 
more laborious to generate than multiple regressions, but they can also reveal insights that are 
otherwise lost in the statistical fog. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has sought to answer two questions about redistricting initiatives, which after 
Vieth and LULAC represent the only realistic way to curb political gerrymandering. First, are 
redistricting initiatives (and the redistricting commissions they invariably seek to create) a good 
idea? Second, and more importantly, why do redistricting initiatives generally fail, and what can 
reformers do to improve such measures’ odds of success in the future? Part I made the case for 
 
289 See supra note 286. 
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redistricting initiatives and redistricting commissions. Redistricting initiatives unblock stoppages 
in the democratic process, thereby allowing the public to enact electoral reform over the 
opposition of self-interested legislators. And redistricting commissions are in theory better suited 
to district-drawing than state legislatures, and empirically have produced more competitive 
elections and more representative results.  
 Part II, the heart of the Article, first discussed a series of variables that might be expected 
to influence initiative outcomes. The section then examined in detail the twelve redistricting 
initiatives that have taken place over the course of American history. For each initiative 
campaign, the measure’s supporters and opponents (as well as their principal arguments) were 
described, and tentative explanations for the measure’s eventual success or failure were 
proposed. Part III, finally, considered the twelve redistricting initiatives holistically in search of 
broader explanations for their outcomes and lessons applicable to future campaigns. The 
section’s main finding was that, contrary to the academic conventional wisdom, redistricting 
initiatives always fail when they are strongly opposed by the majority party in the state 
legislature. If reformers are to have any hope of success, they need to find some way—e.g. 
capitalizing on favorable national developments, winning the enthusiastic support of a state’s 
media establishment, sowing dissension between the majority party’s executive branch officials 
and its legislators—to defuse majority party opposition. 
 This finding is especially ironic because it undermines one of the central premises of 
direct democracy: that it enables the people to bypass the legislature and enact desired policies 
despite the politicians’ resistance. If redistricting initiatives fail when they are strongly opposed 
by most legislators, and succeed when they are not, then they seem to be no different from 
conventional legislation. There are, however, two characteristics of redistricting initiatives that 
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distinguish them from regular bills and make them (slightly) more likely to become law. First, 
they may be (and usually are) placed on the ballot by groups other than state legislators. This 
means that redistricting reform may become a major political issue even when there is nothing 
that elected officials would rather talk about less.  
Second, redistricting campaigns have a way of unfolding unpredictably. Polls gyrate up 
and down, media barrages shift public opinion back and forth, party fissures are revealed and 
then healed, national developments intercede, etc. The outcome in the end may usually be defeat 
for the pro-initiative side, but there is at least more volatility, and hence more hope, in initiative 
campaigns than in state legislative chambers. Proponents of redistricting reform, then, should not 
yet conclude that the direct democracy game is not worth the candle. The odds of success for 
redistricting initiatives are low—but they are not zero, and they are higher than the probability of 
meaningful legislative or judicial action. 
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APPENDIX A: FEATURES OF THE TWELVE REDISTRICTING INITIATIVES
State Year Outcome Level Redistricting Criteria Commission Composition
Arkansas 1936 Yes State Commission draws districts with equal population that are
contiguous and do not divide counties.
Three members: governor, secretary of
state, and attorney general.
Oklahoma 1960 No State Commission enforces standards already in Oklahoma
constitution; each county guaranteed one House member;
ceiling on House members per county eliminated.
Three members: attorney general, treasurer,
and secretary of state.
Oklahoma 1962 Yes State Commission enforces standards already in Oklahoma
constitution; constitutional formula is unchanged.
Three members: attorney general, treasurer,
and secretary of state.
North Dakota 1973 No State Commission draws single-member districts with equal
population.
Nine members: two each picked by Senate
majority and minority leaders, and House
majority and minority leaders; the eight
then pick the ninth, who is the chairman.
Colorado 1974 Yes State Commission draws districts while considering equal
population, compactness, contiguity, and preservation of
political boundaries and communities of interest.
Eleven members: four picked by legislature,
three by governor, and four by judiciary.
Ohio 1981 No State and federal Commission chooses among submitted plans, on basis of
district compactness.
Five members: two Democrats, two
Republicans, and a fifth member chosen by
the first four.
California 1982 No State and federal Commission draws districts while considering equal
population, compactness, and respect for political boundaries.
Ten members: four selected by appellate
judges, four selected by Senate and
Assembly party caucuses, four selected by
party chairmen.
California 1984 No State and federal Commission draws districts while considering
competitiveness, compactness, respect for political
boundaries, and equal population.
Eight members: all retired judges selected
by lottery, four from each major party.
California 1990 No State and federal Commission chooses among submitted plans, on basis of
equal population, minority group power, respect for county
boundaries, compactness, contiguity, respect for political
boundaries, and competitiveness.
Twelve members: ten from major parties
and two independents, picked by judges.
Arizona 2000 Yes State and federal Commission draws districts while considering equal
population, compactness, contiguity, preservation of political
boundaries and communities of interest, and competitiveness.
Five members: appellate court picks
twenty-five candidates; state legislature
leaders pick four commissioners; those four
pick chair.
California 2005 No State and federal Commission draws districts while considering equal
population and minimization of county and city splitting, and
ignoring party affiliations of voters.
Three members: retired judges chosen by
legislature leaders through complicated
formula.
Ohio 2005 No State and federal Commission chooses among submitted plans, on basis of
competitiveness.
Five members. two chosen by sitting
judges; those two then pick remainder.
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APPENDIX B: FACTORS IN REDISTRICTING INITIATIVES’ SUCCESS OR FAILURE
State Year Outcome Vote Side
spending
more
Governor
position
Strength of
governor’s
position
Legislature
majority
party
position
Strength of
legislature
majority
party
position
Legislature
minority
party
position
Strength of
legislature
minority
party
position
Arkansas 1936 Yes 66-34 Unclear Unclear Weak Unclear Weak Unclear Weak
Oklahoma 1960 No 35-65 Unclear For Strong Against Strong For Weak
Oklahoma 1962 Yes 55-45 For For Weak Against Weak For Weak
North Dakota 1973 No 45-55 For For Weak Against Strong For Strong
Colorado 1974 Yes 60-40 Unclear Unclear Weak Against Weak For Weak
Ohio 1981 No 42-58 For For Weak Against* Strong For* Weak
California 1982 No 45-55 For Against Strong Against Strong For Strong
California 1984 No 45-55 Against For Strong Against Strong For Strong
California 1990 No 36-64 Against For Weak Against Strong Split Weak
Arizona 2000 Yes 56-44 Unclear Unclear Weak Split Weak For Strong
California 2005 No 40-60 Against For Strong Against Strong Split Weak
Ohio 2005 No 30-70 Against Against Weak Against Strong For Weak
State Year Outcome Vote Editorial
position of
most
newspapers
Interest
group
positions
Recent
egregious
gerrymander
Major
relevant
national
developments
More
effective
framing
Arkansas 1936 Yes 66-34 For Unclear Yes No For
Oklahoma 1960 No 35-65 For Split Yes No Against
Oklahoma 1962 Yes 55-45 For Split Yes Yes Unclear
North Dakota 1973 No 45-55 Against Split Yes No Against
Colorado 1974 Yes 60-40 Split For Yes Yes Unclear
Ohio 1981 No 42-58 Split For No No Against
California 1982 No 45-55 Against For Yes No Against
California 1984 No 45-55 Against Split Yes No Against
California 1990 No 36-64 Split Split Yes No Against
Arizona 2000 Yes 56-44 For For Yes No For
California 2005 No 40-60 For Split Yes No Unclear
Ohio 2005 No 30-70 Against Split Yes No Against
* Control over the Ohio state legislature was split in 1981, with Democratic control of the House and Republican control of the Senate.
